

National Security Council Files

1943 Middle East War, 25 October, 1943 — File No. 20

8

DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD [NIXON PROJECT]				
DOCUMENT NUMBER	DOCUMENT TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE OR CORRESPONDENTS	DATE	RESTRICTION
1	report	Intelligence Information Cable	10/25/73	B
2	telegram	Amemb Jidda to Sec State	10/25/73	B
3	reports	Situation Reports	10/25/73	B
4	telegram	Sec State to Amemb Madrid	10/25/73	B
5	cable	Peterson to Sisco and Ather ton	10/25/73	B
6	report	Intelligence Information Cable	10/25/73	B
FILE GROUP TITLE NSC			BOX NUMBER 1175	
FOLDER TITLE (8)				

RESTRICTION CODES

A. Release would violate a Federal statute or Agency Policy.
 B. National security classified information.
 C. Pending or approved claim that release would violate an individual's rights.
 D. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy or a libel of a living person.

E. Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information.
 F. Release would disclose investigatory information compiled for law enforcement purposes.
 G. Withdrawn and return private and personal material.
 H. Withdrawn and returned non-historical material.

unav
Oct. 25, 1973

DRAFT MESSAGE

TO General-Secretary Brezhnev

The unilateral movement of Soviet military forces into Egypt, an area not contiguous to the Soviet Union, creates a situation unique in the post World War II era. It is a situation of very grave significance.

The United States in the present crisis in the Middle East has worked from the assumption that the interests of world peace would best be served if the United States and the Soviet Union could avoid direct military involvement in the crisis and could cooperate in ending the fighting and establishing a framework for a durable peace settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. We still hold that assumption. We cannot conceive that the unilateral introduction of forces of a great nuclear power into this area can contribute to lessening tensions in the Middle East, to world peace or to the evolution of sound relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Now that the Soviet Union, however, has taken upon itself the introduction of its forces into Egypt, I must inform you of my decision to send American military units to various points in the Middle East for the purpose of helping to stabilize the situation there. We are prepared to remove these forces, and we are convinced that this course should be followed as quickly as possible.

(Handwritten: 11/11)
(Handwritten: First version)
October 25, 1973

CONTINGENCY PAPER

DIPLOMATIC SCENARIO

Introduction of US Force in Connection with Enforcing Ceasefire

Assumption: The Soviets are moving their own military forces into the Cairo area "to police the ceasefire." It has been impossible to pass a UN Security Council Resolution calling for a UN force limited to the non-permanent members of the Security Council and other UN members.

The issue is to design a diplomatic scenario for the parallel introduction of US forces.

The US objectives are:

1. To prevent such a Soviet move from fundamentally altering the balance of power in the Middle East through the stationing of major Soviet combat forces there on a long-term basis.
2. To show our friends and allies in the Middle East and elsewhere that the US has the resolve to oppose a Soviet move of this significance.
3. To put ourselves in a position where the removal of Soviet forces can be negotiated in parallel to the withdrawal of US forces when a UN force without permanent Security Council members can be assembled.
4. To help stabilize the ceasefire.

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The US purpose should be to introduce forces in such a way that the US does not appear to be moving in support of Israeli military gains since the first ceasefire. To do this, it would be desirable if US forces were not stationed exclusively in Israel and were stationed in addition in one or two Arab countries. The most likely possibility is Jordan.

In considering this question, it is noted that the Soviets already have military personnel in Syria and Iraq in an advisory capacity.

The possibility of introducing US forces into Lebanon and Saudi Arabia as well as into Jordan has been considered. The advantages would be symbolically to broaden understanding that we were not moving primarily in support of Israel. There is the major disadvantage, however, that a US military presence in Lebanon would put us in the middle of a very tense Lebanese situation which has its own unique aspects. On balance, this is not recommended.

As for Saudi Arabia, Saudi consent would depend on the degree to which the Saudis judged that the US move was more anti-Soviet than pro-Israel. On balance, it seems likely that the Saudis would be very cautious about accepting a US presence.

Diplomatic Scenario

Diplomatically, six sets of action are required:

Phase 1 - First, an approach to those countries to which we would propose staging the US force, explaining our purposes and objectives and seeking their concurrence. At a minimum, these would be Israel and Jordan. Simultaneously, we should inform Lebanon and Saudi Arabia of

- 3 -

our proposal and probe whether they would accept some symbolic units, although their acquiescence is unlikely. In any event we would ask the Saudis, Jordanians and Lebanese to weigh in with Sadat to elicit his understanding of our move.

Phase II (following receipt of agreement from governments concerned for stationing troops on their territory) - Second, an approach to the Soviets and Egyptians advising them of what we are doing and why.

Third, an approach to NATO making clear we expect a firm showing of allied solidarity.

Fourth, an approach to special friends who have a particular interest in and concern about the Arab-Israel conflict and its implications for their interests. This should include at a minimum the Shah of Iran and Prime Minister Bhutto of Pakistan.

Fifth, a general approach worldwide to all governments not recipients of one of the special messages outlined above.

Sixth, instructions to Ambassador Scali on what posture to take in the Security Council, including the text of a statement he would make in the Council.

Implementing instructions for the foregoing scenario are attached.

In addition, it will be necessary to make high level approaches to those governments from whom overflight and other support facilities en route are required according to the military plan adopted.

SECRET

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URGENT

Faisal → Nixon^{war}
10/25/73



Your Excellency President Richard Nixon:

The situation in the Middle East is deteriorating rapidly. Such a state of affairs will not serve anyone's interests, but will ultimately result in a struggle between the Great Powers at the expense of the area's peoples. One of its consequences will be Communist expansion in that part of the world. We hope that you will take a resolute position as regards Israel, and compel it to implement the Security Council's resolution of October 22/23, 1973 by withdrawing from all the occupied Arab territories.

Faisal

9/29/93, corresponding to 10/25/73.

SECRET

United Nations
16636
7/15
Revised Security Council Resolution Incorporating
Amendments Accepted by Non-Aligned Cosponsors
October 25, 1973 1:30 p.m.

Adopted
1530, 10/25

"The Security Council

"Recalling its resolutions 338 of 21st October 1973
and 339 of 23rd October 1973,

"Noting with regret the reported repeated violations
of the ceasefire in non-compliance with the
resolutions 338 and 339,

"Noting with concern from the Secretary-General's
report that the United Nations observers have not yet
been able to place themselves on both sides of the
ceasefire line,

"(1) Demands that immediate and complete ceasefire
be observed and that the parties return to the
positions occupied by them at 5.50 GMT on 22nd
October 1973, 1650

"(2) Requests the Secretary-General, as an immediate
step, to increase the number of UN observers on both
sides,

"(3) Decides to set up immediately a United Nations
Emergency Force under its authority, to be composed
of personnel to be drawn from states members of the
UN except the permanent members of the SC, and requests
the Secretary-General to report within 24 hours on
the steps taken to this effect,

"(4) Requests the Secretary-General to report to the
Council on an urgent and continuing basis of the
state of implementation of this resolution as well as
resolutions 338 and 339,

"(5) Requests all member states to extend their full
cooperation to the UN in the implementation of this
resolution as well as resolutions 338 and 339."

FBIS 147

TASS REPORTS ON KISSINGER PRESS CONFERENCE

L252226 MOSCOW TASS INTERNATIONAL SERVICE IN RUSSIAN 2208 GMT 25 OCT 73 L

(TEXT) WASHINGTON--H. KISSINGER, U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE AND ADVISER TO THE PRESIDENT ON NATIONAL SECURITY, SPOKE AT A PRESS CONFERENCE WHICH WAS DEVOTED TO THE SITUATION IN THE NEAR EAST.

H. KISSINGER DWELT ON THE EFFORTS BEING MADE AT THE PRESENT TIME BY THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES IN ORDER TO GET AN EFFECTIVE CEASE-FIRE AND A START OF NEGOTIATIONS ON SETTLING THE NEAR EAST CONFLICT WITH THE AIM OF ESTABLISHING A JUST AND LASTING PEACE IN THAT REGION. H. KISSINGER STRESSED THAT PARTICULAR RESPONSIBILITY RESTS ON THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION IN THE SETTLEMENT OF THIS CONFLICT. OUR JOINT ACTIONS, KISSINGER SAID, HAVE BEEN DIRECTED AT GETTING THE SPEEDIEST POSSIBLE CEASE-FIRE.

THE SECRETARY OF STATE NOTED: MY TRIP TO MOSCOW, WHERE I HAD TALKS WITH L.I. BREZHNEV, GENERAL SECRETARY OF THE CPSU CENTRAL COMMITTEE, AND WHERE A FORMULA, ACCEPTABLE IN OUR OPINION TO BOTH SIDES TAKING PART IN THE CONFLICT, WAS WORKED OUT, TOOK PLACE IN THE LIGHT OF THESE JOINT EFFORTS.

H. KISSINGER STATED THAT THE UNITED STATES INTENDS TO ACT IN THE SPIRIT OF THE AGREEMENT ACHIEVED IN MOSCOW.

THE U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE WENT ON TO NOTE THAT VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASE-FIRE HAVE OCCURRED IN RECENT DAYS IN THE NEAR EAST. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE SAID NEW EFFORTS TO INSURE THAT THE RESOLUTION IS CARRIED OUT HAVE BEEN MADE BY THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE UN FRAMEWORK.

REGARDING THIS, H. KISSINGER EXPRESSED OPPOSITION TO THE IDEA OF SENDING AMERICAN AND SOVIET TROOPS TO THE NEAR EAST FOR THE PURPOSE OF IMPLEMENTING THE CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTION. HE SAID THE UNITED STATES SUPPORTS THE SENDING TO THE NEAR EAST OF UN OBSERVERS AND WILL RENDER EVERY ASSISTANCE IN THIS MATTER. THE UNITED STATES IS ALSO READY TO BACK THE SENDING TO THE NEAR EAST OF UN ARMED FORCES TO ENSURE THE CEASE-FIRE. HOWEVER, THIS INTERNATIONAL FORCE SHOULD NOT INCLUDE THE FORCES OF THE PERMANENT UN SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBER-COUNTRIES.

H. KISSINGER STRESSED THAT, DESPITE THE DIFFICULTIES THAT HAVE ARISEN IN CONNECTION WITH CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS, HE THINKS THAT THE POSSIBILITIES OF ESTABLISHING PEACE IN THE NEAR EAST ARE "MOST PROMISING."

KISSINGER SAID THAT, ON THE BASIS OF TALKS WITH L.I. BREZHNEV AND PERMANENT DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS I HAVE EVERY REASON TO SUPPOSE THAT A COMMON STANDPOINT IN OUR EFFORTS TO OBTAIN LASTING PEACE IN THE NEAR EAST CAN BE ACHIEVED BETWEEN US. WE ARE READY TO COOPERATE IN THIS REGARD.

25 OCT 2346Z SKIP/MC

WAR
25 Oct



Department of State

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WAR

25 Oct

CONFIDENTIAL 270

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 12450 251049Z

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ACTION NEA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 IO-14 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 INRE-00

USSS-00 ACDA-19 AID-20 OMB-01 OPR-02 EUR-25 CIAE-00

PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01

PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 USIA-15 AF-10 DRC-01 /182 W
073424

R 251012Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4900
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY JIDDA
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
DIA WASHDC
USMISSION USUN
CINCEUR
USINT BAGHDAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 12450

DEPT PASS CAIRO

E.O. 11652: NGDS
TAGS: PINS SY
SUBJECT: SYRIAN INTERNAL SITUATION

REF: AMMAN 5665 AND 5675

INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US ON SYRIAN SITUATION FROM SEVERAL DIFFERENT RELIABLE SOURCES CONFIRMS VIEW REPORTED AMMAN REFTELS. ALTHOUGH SYRIAN ARMY BADLY HURT, MORALE NEVER BROKE NOR DID DETERMINATION TO FIGHT LAG. SOME MAJOR UNITS OF ARMY IN PROCESS REORGANIZING AND REEQUIPPING WHEN CEASE-FIRE ACCEPTED. GENERAL FEELING AMONG ARMY, INCLUDING WOUNDED OFFICERS WHO HOSPITALIZED BEIRUT BUT RETURNED TO UNITS ON HEARING OF CEASE-FIRE,

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PAGE 02 BEIRUT 12450 251049Z

IS THAT SARG SHOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED IT. MORALE OF CIVILIAN POPULATION ALSO HIGH, WITH DETERMINATION WAGE "POPULAR WAR" DESPITE HEAVY DAMAGE TO ECONOMIC SECTOR. ON OTHER HAND, SYRIAN PARTICIPATION IN WAR AND RELATIVE SUCCESS OF ITS ARMY GREATLY INCREASED STRENGTH OF PRESIDENT ASSAD AND AT LEAST TEMPORARILY EFFACED USUAL SYRIAN SECTARIAN AND POLITICAL DISSENSION. IT WAS THIS STRENGTH PLUS SUPPORT OF USSR, EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA (BY MEANS OF POL EMBARGO ON US) WHICH ENABLED ASSAD PUSH THROUGH HIS DECISION ACCEPT CEASE-FIRE. HIS ABILITY HOLD OUT FOR LONG IF THERE NO VISIBLE POLITICAL GAINS FROM SUCH DECISION IS CONSIDERED, AS NOTED REFTEL, "DICEY". HOSTILE PRESSURES COMING FROM IRAQIS, IRAQI-LINING MEMBERS OF SYRIAN BAATH, AND FEDAYEEN. BUFFUM

NOTE BY OCT: NOT PASSED CAIRO.

CONFIDENTIAL

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SECRET 571

PAGE 01 BEIRUT 12470 251502Z

42
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 CCO-00 NSCE-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00

INRE-00 /031 W

O 251443Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4908
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV NIACT IMMEDIATE

SECRET BEIRUT 12470
EXDIS
EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PINS LE IS
SUBJ: FEDAYEEN LEADERS AGREE TO STOP BORDER OPERATIONS

REF: BEIRUT 12333

NEGIB SADAKA, SECRETARY GENEGOL OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TELEPHONED DCM TO SAY THAT PRIME MINISTER SOLH HAD ONCE AGAIN SPOKEN FIRMLY AND FRANKLY WITH LEADERS OF BOTH PATAH AND SAJQA. LEADERS BOTH GROUPS AGREED CEASE ALL ACTIVITIES ON BORDER ON CONDITION THAT: (A) ISRAEL OBSERVE CEASEFIRE, AND (B) ISRAEL SUBSEQUENTLY (PRESUMABLY IN PEACE NEGOTIATIONS) PUBLICLY RECOGNIZED PALESTINIAN RIGHTS AND THEIR CAUSE (SADAKA INDICATED FEDAYEEN LEADERS RATHER VAGUE ON SECOND CONDITION). SADAKA EMPHASIZED GOL WAS VIGILANT AND WAS DOING ALL IT COULD TO KEEP BORDER QUIET. BUFFUM

NOTE BY OC/T: EXDIS CAPTION ADDED PER MR. FINNERTY, S/SO.

075609
ANDERSON _____
HOLDRIDGE _____
HORMATS _____
JORDEN _____
KENNEDY _____
LEHMAN _____
LEVINE _____
NEGROPONTE _____
ODEEN _____
RATLIFF _____
RONDON _____
SAUNDERS _____
SONNENFELDT _____
V. I. G. _____
WALSH _____

D/B

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WAR

SECRET 877

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ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 CCO-00 DODE-00 CIAE-00

INRE-00 NSAE-00 USSS-00 /031 W

076814

O 251613Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY BONN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8285

SECRET SECTION 01 OF 03 BONN 15456

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, XF, GW
SUBJECT: FRG UNMOVING IN OPPOSITION TO FURTHER US ARMS
SHIPMENTS FROM FRG TO MIDDLE EAST

REF: STATE 210441

SUMMARY: AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND CALLED ON FRG
FOREIGN OFFICE STATE SECRETARY FRANK OCTOBER 25 TO
PRESENT US GOVERNMENT VIEWS CONTAINED REFTEL. FRANK
REMAINED FIRM IN EXPRESSING FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S POSI-
TION THAT NO FURTHER US SHIPMENTS TO ISRAEL SHOULD
OCCUR FROM FRG TERRITORY. HE EXPLAINED THE "MASSIVE
PRESSURES" ON THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT FROM THE ARAB
GOVERNMENTS AND SAID THAT THE FRG WAS PARTICULARLY
CONCERNED ABOUT A POSSIBLE ARAB OIL BOYCOTT. FRANK
ASKED THAT THE USG, FOR WHOSE INTERESTS THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT HAD SHOWN FULL UNDERSTANDING IN THE EARLIER
PHASES OF THE MIDDLE EAST CONFLICT, RECIPROCATATE BY
NOW SHOWING UNDERSTANDING FOR THE DIFFICULT GERMAN
POSITION. AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND INDICATED THAT THE
GERMAN POSITION WOULD OBVIOUSLY CAUSE GREAT CONCERN IN
WASHINGTON, PARTICULARLY IN VIEW OF INDICATIONS THAT
THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS STILL FAR FROM
SETTLED.

ANDERSON
HOLDEN
HORMATS
JORDEN
KEDNEY
LEVINE
NEGROPONTE
ODEEN
RATLIFF
RONDON
SAUNDERS
SCHNEEFELDT
V. I. G.
WALSH

✓ D/10

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1. AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND PRESENTED THE US POSITION FULLY TO STATE SECRETARY FRANK IN ACCORDANCE WITH REPTel. HE ADDED THAT CONTRARY TO FRANK'S APPARENT UNDERSTANDING OF THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST, IT WAS STILL FAR FROM SETTLED, AND THERE WAS EVERY INDICATION THAT THE ISRAELIS WOULD REQUIRE FURTHER RESUPPLYING. AMBASSADOR HILLENBRAND NOTED THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE SITUATION BY ALLUDING TO THE US DECISION TO PLACE ITS TROOPS IN GERMANY ON ALERT. HE COMMENTED THAT THIS MOVE HARDLY SUGGESTED THAT THE CONFLICT HAD BEEN DIFFUSED, AS FRANK HAD SUGGESTED THE PREVIOUS EVENING (BONN 15408). THE AMBASSADOR CONCLUDED BY REQUESTING THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT RECONSIDER ITS POSITION.

2. FRANK SAID THAT THE GERMAN POSITION HAD BEEN TAKEN BY CHANCELLOR BRANDT, AND THAT THE POSITION WAS FIRM. HE REFERRED TO THE UNDERSTANDING WHICH FOREIGN MINISTER SCHEEL HAD EXPRESSED FOR THE US POSITION AT THE AMBASSADORS' MEETING ON OCTOBER 16. FRANK SAID THAT SINCE THEN, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAD COME UNDER MASSIVE PRESSURE FROM THE ARAB STATES WHO HAD CHARGED THAT THE WEAPONS DELIVERIES EFFECTED FROM GERMAN SOIL HAD PERMITTED THE ISRAELIS TO MOUNT THE OFFENSIVE WHICH GAVE THEM THE BRIDGEHEAD ON THE WEST BANK OF THE SUEZ. HE SAID THE ARABS CONTINUED TO EXERCISE HEAVY PRESSURE ON THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, WITH THE ARABS NOW CHARGING THAT GERMAN CREDIBILITY WAS NO LONGER TO BE TRUSTED. FRANK SAID THAT THIS LATTER CHARGE STEMMED FROM THE FACT THAT FOLLOWING HIS DISCUSSION WITH THE AMBASSADOR ON OCTOBER 23, HE HAD INFORMED THE EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR IN BONN THAT NO FURTHER SHIPMENTS TO ISRAEL WOULD TAKE PLACE FROM FRG TERRITORY. THE SHIPPING OF MATERIEL IN THE PAST FEW DAYS FROM BREMERHAVEN BY ISRAELI SHIPS HAD MADE NONSENSE OF THIS STATEMENT TO THE EGYPTIAN AMBASSADOR.

3. FRANK STATED THAT AT NO TIME SINCE THE OCTOBER 16 MEETING BETWEEN SCHEEL AND THE AMBASSADOR HAD ANYONE ON THE GERMAN SIDE CONCEIVED IT POSSIBLE THAT ISRAELI SHIPS

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WOULD BE USED TO TRANSPORT THE ARMS AND MILITARY GOODS FROM BREMERHAVEN. WHEN THE GOVERNMENT LEARNED OF THE ISRAELI SHIPS INVOLVEMENT, IT HAD IMMEDIATELY ASKED THAT THE SHIP LOADING IN BREMERHAVEN DEPART ASAP, AND HAD MADE THE DECISION THAT THE SHIP PRESENTLY LYING IN BREMEN WOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO LOAD ANY GOODS. HE SAID THIS DECISION HAD BEEN MADE IN ORDER TO TRY TO RESTORE SOME

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ACTION ID=14

INFO OCT=01 AF=10 ARA=16 EA=11 EUR=25 NEA=10 RSC=01

CIAE=00 DODE=00 PM=07 H=03 INR=10 L=03 NSAE=00 NSC=10

PA=04 PRS=01 SPC=03 SS=20 USIA=15 ACDA=19 OMB=01

DRC=01 /185 W

072678

R 250649Z OCT 73
FM USMISSION USUN NY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0478
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
USINT CAIRO
AMCONGEN JERUSALEM
AMCONGEN HONG KONG
USLO PEKING

UNCLAS USUN 4187

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PFOR UNSC XF
SUBJ: MIDDLE EAST IN SC

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF AMB SCALII'S STATEMENT IN SC OCT 24:

MR. PRESIDENT:

THE SECURITY COUNCIL MEETS TONIGHT, FOR THE
THIRD TIME IN FOUR DAYS, ON A NOTE OF INCREASING
URGENCY. IN SPITE OF TWO SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS
ADOPTED WITHOUT A DISSENTING VOTE, CALLING UPON THE
PARTIES IN THE STRONGEST TERMS TO CEASE ALL FIGHTING
AND TO TERMINATE ALL MILITARY ACTIVITY, MILITARY

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OPERATIONS HAVE RECURRED IN THE ZONES OF COMBAT. AS LONG AS THE FIGHTING GOES ON, EVEN INTERMITTENTLY THE PARTIES INCUR INCREASING LOSSES; THE FORCES OF HATE AND FEAR ARE STRENGTHENED; THE DIFFICULTY OF ATTAINING A LASTING PEACE DEEPENS; AND THE TASK OF RECONCILIATION BECOMES MORE DIFFICULT.

TONIGHT THIS COUNCIL IS CONVENED AT THE REQUEST OF THE DELEGATION OF EGYPT. THE DISTINGUISHED FOREIGN MINISTER OF EGYPT HAS SUGGESTED THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL INVITE THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES TO SEND FORCES TO THE AREA TO SUPERVISE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CEASE-FIRE ON THE PART OF ISRAEL AND TO ENSURE ITS EFFECTIVENESS.

AT THE SAME TIME THE COUNCIL IS CONFRONTED BY CLAIMS FROM THE ISRAELI SIDE THAT EGYPTIAN FORCES FAILED TO ABIDE BY THE CEASE-FIRE AND ARE ACCORDINGLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE FACT THAT HOSTILITIES HAVE RECURRED.

LET ME SAY AGAIN, AS I SAID YESTERDAY, THAT IT REMAINS IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE THE ACCURACY OF THESE CONTRADICTORY CHARGES. UNTIL THE IMPARTIAL OBSERVERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION CAN REACH THEIR POSTS IN THE AREAS OF CONTACT AND CAN REPORT TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE ORGANIZATION, WE WILL BE UNABLE TO ASSESS WITH CERTAINTY THESE CONFLICTING CLAIMS.

ACCORDINGLY, THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT THE COUNCIL HAS BEFORE IT TWO URGENT TASKS. FIRST, IT MUST IMPRESS UPON THE PARTIES WITH RENEWED VIGOR THAT EACH OF THEM MUST COMPLY IMMEDIATELY AND FULLY WITH THE CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTIONS WE HAVE ADOPTED. SECOND, IT SHOULD URGE AND ENCOURAGE THE SECRETARY-GENERAL AND THE CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE UN TRUCE SUPERVISION ORGANIZATION TO MOVE AS PROMPTLY AS POSSIBLE TO PLACE ADDITIONAL OBSERVERS ON THE SPOT.

MR. PRESIDENT, THE DISTINGUISHED FOREIGN MINISTER OF EGYPT HAS SUGGESTED THAT THE SECURITY COUNCIL INVITE THE SOVIET UNION AND THE UNITED STATES TO SEND ARMED FORCES TO THE AREA OF

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FIGHTING IN ORDER TO SUPERVISE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CEASE FIRE. IN THE VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES, THIS IS NOT A TIME IN WHICH INVOLVEMENT BY THE GREAT POWERS THROUGH THE DISPATCH OF THEIR ARMED FORCES COULD BE HELPFUL IN CREATING CONDITIONS OF PEACE. OUR OBJECTIVE IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAS NOT BEEN TO PRODUCE A MILITARY CONFRONTATION, BUT RATHER TO ENCOURAGE RESTRAINT AND CAUTION ON BOTH SIDES.

THE UNITED STATES REMAINS COMMITTED TO RESOLUTION 338 AND RESOLUTION 339 OF THIS COUNCIL. IN ALL THEIR PARTS, WE BELIEVE THAT THE PARTIES, WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS, CAN AND WILL BRING THE FIGHTING TO AN END. FOR OUR PART, I CAN STATE THAT WE HAVE BEEN IN ACTIVE AND SERIOUS CONSULTATION WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF ISRAEL TO IMPRESS UPON IT THE URGENCY OF ABSOLUTE ADHERENCE TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL'S CEASE FIRE RESOLUTIONS. WE WILL CONTINUE TO MAKE THESE REPRESENTATIONS AS REQUIRED.

WE ALSO AGREE, AS I SAID YESTERDAY, THAT THE FORCES OF THE PARTIES SHOULD RETURN TO THE POSITIONS THEY OCCUPIED WHEN THE CEASE FIRE BECAME EFFECTIVE. MR. MALIK KNOWS WE HAVE EXERTED ALL OF OUR EFFORTS TO PUT THIS CEASEFIRE INTO EFFECT -- TO TRANSLATE IT FROM A CAREFULLY BALANCED APPEAL TO A REALITY WHICH WILL END THE KILLING. IN KEEPING WITH THE UNDERSTANDING SECRETARY KISSINGER NEGOTIATED WITH SOVIET LEADERS IN MOSCOW -- IN A SPIRIT OF FRIENDSHIP -- AS PART OF OUR EFFORT TO IMPROVE RELATIONS ON A BROAD FRONT WITH THE SOVIET UNION, WE HAVE DONE OUR PART TO CARRY OUT OUR PART OF THE AGREEMENT --

CALMLY, WITHOUT SEEKING TO EXTRACT PROPAGANDA ADVANTAGE. BUT IT CANNOT BE DONE BY SNAPPING OUR FINGERS. IN A HIGHLY EMOTIONAL STATE OF AFFAIRS -- IN TIME OF WAR -- IT IS NOT EASY.

AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE, THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES TODAY, AS IT MADE CLEAR IN MY STATEMENT OF OCTOBER 8, THAT RETURN TO POSITIONS HELD BEFORE HOSTILITIES

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BROKE OUT IS THE PREFERRED MEANS OF OPENING THE
WAY TO GENUINE RECONCILIATION. ✓

WE WILL CONTINUE TO SUPPORT THIS PRINCIPLE.
BUT IT CAN ONLY BE APPLIED IN THE CONTEXT OF AGREEMENT
AS TO THE GEOGRAPHICAL AND PHYSICAL FACTS. UNTIL
ACTUAL CEASE FIRE LINES ARE DEMARCATED AND IT BECOMES
CLEAR WHERE THE OPPOSING FORCES WERE STATIONED AT A
GIVEN MOMENT IN TIME, THERE CAN BE NO AGREED BASIS
FOR FIRM TRUCE LINES. THIS EMPHASIZES STILL FURTHER
THE NEED FOR COMPLETING THE ORGANIZATION AND PLACEMENT
OF THE TRUCE SUPERVISION FORCE, AND FOR ENSURING THAT
THE COUNCIL AND THE PARTIES ARE FULLY INFORMED OF
DEVELOPMENTS, AND THE MILITARY COMMANDERS OF THE TWO
SIDES INSTRUCTED IN COMPELLING TERMS TO STOP THE
FIGHTING.
SCALT

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

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A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.

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CIA (LDX)

NSA (LDX)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center

MIDDLE EAST TASK FORCE
Situation Report #64

Situation Report in the Middle East as of 1800 EDT, 10/25

Cease-Fire

Israel informs us that it is cooperating fully with UNTSO regarding deployment of observers both in the north and south. Two UNTSO teams from Cairo are taking up positions on the west bank of the Canal on the Israeli side of the line. Six of the seven units destined for the Egyptian side are now in place and reporting.

The Israelis claim that the Egyptian Third Army is totally isolated on the east bank of the Suez Canal between Great Bitter Lake and Suez City. They also claim the IDF controls all supply lines from Egypt to Suez City and the Third Army, and that the Israeli navy is patrolling the northern Gulf of Suez. Therefore, they effectively blockade the coast of the Third Army area. The IDF reports that Egyptian forces on the east side of the Canal consist of approximately 30,000 men and 200 tanks.

On the Syrian side, 3 UN observer teams have reached the forward IDF position on the Golan Heights and have set up operations.

The Egyptian reaction to the Israeli penetration into the west bank and the second cease-fire is one of confusion and disbelief. Hard questions have begun to be asked. The Cairo press is trying to down-play the extent of the Israeli presence and calm doubts about the military situation.

The Saudis are reported to be relieved over the cease-fire, but skeptical as to its duration and its ultimate significance. Embassy Jidda does not

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GDS - DECLAS Dec. 31, 1991

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expect the Saudis to revoke the steps they have taken in regard to oil until the outline of a settlement acceptable to Saudi Arabia becomes clear.

Major fedayeen leaders (Fatah and Saiqa) in Lebanon have reportedly agreed to cease border activities on condition that Israel observe the ceasefire and subsequently publicly recognize Palestinian rights and the Palestinian cause. The Lebanese are seeking assurances from smaller fedayeen groups. The GOL tells us it is doing all it can to keep the border with Israel quiet.

Security Council Resolution

The Security Council adopted the revised eight-power resolution at approximately 1530 EDT. The vote was 14 in favor, with China not participating. The latest resolution demands an immediate ceasefire and a return to positions occupied at 1650 GMT on October 22, calls for an increase in the number of UN observers on both sides, and decides to set up a UN Emergency Force composed of personnel from UN member states except permanent members of the Security Council.

FRG Opposition to US Arms Shipments

In response to Ambassador Hillenbrand's presentation of USG views today, the FRG remained firm in its position that no further US arms shipments to Israel be made from the FRG. According to the FRG, there are "massive pressures" from the Arab governments on the FRG, and the Arabs have charged that weapons deliveries from the FRG helped the Israelis counter the Arab offensive and establish the bridgehead on the west bank of the Suez Canal. The FRG expressed particular concern about a possible Arab oil boycott. The FRG asked that the USG reciprocate previous German understanding in the earlier phases of the Middle East conflict by showing an understanding now for the difficult German position.

Israeli Relations with Africa

Nigeria announced today that it had broken relations with Israel. The reason given was that Israel had

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advanced beyond the 1967 ceasefire lines on the West Bank of the Suez Canal. Liberia reportedly finds itself in a difficult position because of breaks with Israel by Nigeria and Ethiopia, and will be reconsidering the issue of breaking relations with Israel tomorrow or the next day.

Syrians and Egyptians Accuse U.S. of Reconnaissance Flights

The Syrians have reportedly accused the U.S. of resuming "spy flights", claiming that an unmanned SR-71 penetrated their airspace this morning and then returned to Israel. Egypt claimed the U.S. conducted two overflights of Egyptian territory at high altitude today.

APPROVED BY: 

DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS

SECRET/EXDIS

FORM DS 32240CR1

SECRET

TEXT AS RECEIVED FROM WHITE HOUSE
10/25/73
S-THE SECRETARY
S/S:TRPICKERING

*Kennedyfeldt has
cleared with
changes. HHS.*

FLASH ALL EUROPEAN DIPLOMATIC POSTS, PEKING FLASH,
TOKYO FLASH, AMMAN FLASH, ANKARA FLASH, ATHENS FLASH, BEIRUT FLASH

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY

1. AS YOU ARE AWARE THE EGYPTIANS HAVE PROPOSED INTRODUCTION OF US AND SOVIET FORCES IN THE AREA OF THE CONFLICT. THE SOVIETS HAVE SUPPORTED THIS PROPOSAL. IN ADDITION, WE HAVE RECEIVED INDICATIONS THAT SOVIETS MAY BE CONSIDERING UNILATERAL INTERVENTION.

2. WE ARE INFORMING SOVIETS THAT INTRODUCTION OF US AND SOVIET MILITARY CONTINGENTS IS INAPPROPRIATE BUT THAT WE ARE READY TO SUPPORT INCREASE IN SUPERVISORY FORCE, INCLUDING, AS AN EXTRAORDINARY AND TEMPORARY MEASURE, SOME US AND SOVIET PERSONNEL. FUNCTION WOULD BE SOLELY SUPERVISORY AND ACQUISITION OF ACCURATE INFORMATION REGARDING COMPLIANCE OF THE TWO SIDES WITH THE CEASEFIRE.

3. AT THE SAME TIME, WE HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT ANY UNILATERAL INTERVENTION BY THE SOVIETS IS WHOLLY UNACCEPTABLE TO US.

4. AS A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE, WE HAVE UNDERTAKEN CERTAIN ALERT MEASURES IN OUR MILITARY FORCES AROUND THE WORLD, INCLUDING EUROPE.

5. WE ARE OF COURSE IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH ISRAELIS TO ENSURE THEIR COMPLIANCE WITH THE CEASEFIRE AND ARE CONFIDENT THAT OUR POSITION WILL BRING THE FIGHTING TO A

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1 2

CONCLUSION.

6. WE HAVE URGENTLY REQUESTED AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD TO INFORM NATO SYG LUNS AND PERMREPS OF ABOVE ON COMPLETELY CONFIDENTIAL BASIS, AND TO EXPRESS OUR HOPE WE CAN COUNT ON FULL NATO SUPPORT FOR OUR ACTIONS IN THIS SITUATION. OUR SOLE PURPOSE IS TO END THE FIGHTING AND LAY THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO A SETTLEMENT AND PREVENT UNILATERAL SOVIET ACTIONS WHICH WOULD REPRESENT GRAVE THREAT TO PEACE. WE ALSO INSTRUCTED AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD TO ENSURE THAT NATO PERMREPS AND LUNS UNDERSTAND THAT WE DO NOT REPEAT NOT WANT A PUBLIC CONFRONTATION WITH THE SOVIETS AND THAT THEREFORE THE INFORMATION CONVEYED TO THEM MUST BE KEPT TOTALLY CONFIDENTIAL.

7. FOREGOING IS FOR YOUR INFORMATION ONLY AND SHOULD NOT BE USED IN ANY WAY. WE ARE MAINTAINING A STRICT NO COMMENT POSITION IN RESPONSE TO INQUIRIES DERIVING FROM OUR ALERT MEASURES. WE HOPE SOON TO BE IN A POSITION TO PROVIDE YOU WITH FURTHER GUIDANCE.44

SECRET

TRANSMITTED BY:
(Date & Time Stamp)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1973 OCT 25 11 11 35

MOST URGENT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center

LDX MESSAGE RECEIPT

S/S #

RECEIVED BY:
(Date & Time Stamp)

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

'73 OCT 25 AM 11:44

LDX MESSAGE NO. 610, CLASSIFICATION SECRET NODIS, NO. PAGES 2

DESCRIPTION OF MSG. Telegram to All European Diplomatic Posts etc.
Message from the Secretary

FROM: Mr. Gammon, S/S, 23126, Room Number
Officer Office Symbol Extension

LDX TO: DELIVER TO: EXTENSION: ROOM NUMBER:

WHITE HOUSE GEN. SCOWCROFT, Room Number
Extension
Room Number
Extension

FOR: CLEARANCE ☒ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: TEXT RECEIVED FROM WHITE HOUSE, APPROVED BY:S

VALIDATED FOR TRANSMISSION BY: [Signature]
Executive Secretariat Officer

-112

THIRD ARMY

TEL AVIV (AP)-THE ISRAELI MILITARY COMMAND SAID TODAY IT WAS SUPPLYING PLASMA TO THE EGYPTIAN 3RD ARMY, SURROUNDED AND CUT OFF WITHOUT SUPPLIES IN THE SINAI DESERT AT THE SOUTHERN TIP OF THE SUEZ CANAL.

MILITARY SPOKESMAN COL. NACHMAN KARNI SAID THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS IN CAIRO MADE THE REQUEST THROUGH INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS OFFICIALS IN JERUSALEM AFTER THEIR EFFORTS TO SUPPLY BLOOD FROM THE EGYPTIAN CAPITAL HAD FAILED.

KARNI SAID ISRAELI FORCES ON THE EAST BANK OF THE CANAL WERE BLOCKADING ALL SUPPLIES TO THE BATTERED EGYPTIAN FORCE OF 20,000.

"THEY HAVE ENOUGH FOOD AND WATER TO LAST THEM SEVERAL DAYS," KARNI TOLD A NEWS BRIEFING. "THEY ARE IN NO IMMEDIATE DANGER OF STARVING OR DYING FROM THIRST. BUT AS A MILITARY FORCE, THEY ARE FINISHED."

THE COLONEL SAID THE ISRAELI PLASMA WAS HANDED TO RED CROSS TEAMS NEAR THE CEASE-FIRE LINE AND TRANSFERRED INTO THE EGYPTIAN ENCLAVE IN AN ASSORTMENT OF RED CROSS AND ISRAELI ARMY TRUCKS.

HUNDREDS OF EGYPTIAN SOLDIERS ALREADY HAVE SURRENDERED TO THE ISRAELIS ON THE WEST BANK OF THE CANAL, KARNI SAID. HE SAID THE MILITARY COMMAND HAD RECEIVED NO WORD OF SURRENDER FROM THE TRAPPED EGYPTIAN FORCE.

KARNI SAID UNITED NATIONS OBSERVER TEAMS ALREADY HAD TAKEN UP POSITIONS ALONG THE SUEZ AND SYRIAN CEASE-FIRE LINES ON THE ISRAELI SIDE AND MORE TEAMS WERE EN ROUTE.

WE310PED OCT 25

WARR
Oct 25

BULLETIN

U.N.-MID. ST

WAR
25 Oct

UNITED NATIONS, N.Y. (AP)-THE SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED
NATIONS SAID TODAY THE SOVIET UNION WOULD AGREE TO THE CREATION OF A
U.N. PEACEKEEPING FORCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST WITHOUT SOVIET,
AMERICAN OR OTHER BIG POWER TROOPS.

PD222PED 10/25

101

UNITED NATIONS--ADD U.N.-MIDEAST (100)

9:335 -.7- -594 -:-97 .-)S(59)S 5E3 7.N. SECURITY COUNCIL HE
WOULD VOTE IN FAVOR OF A PROPOSAL TO DISPATCH SUCH A FORCE TO SUPERVISE
THE SHAKY MIDEAST CEASE-FIRE.

PD226PED 10/25

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

A RESTRICTED DOCUMENT OR CASE FILE HAS BEEN REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER. FOR A DESCRIPTION OF THE ITEM REMOVED AND THE REASON FOR ITS REMOVAL, CONSULT DOCUMENT ENTRY NUMBER 2 ON EITHER THE DOCUMENT WITHDRAWAL RECORD (GSA FORM 7279 OR NA FORM 1421) OR NARA WITHDRAWAL SHEET (GSA FORM 7122) LOCATED IN THE FRONT OF THIS FILE FOLDER.

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X United Nations
→ War
10/25

Revised Security Council Resolution Incorporating
Amendments Accepted by Non-Aligned Cosponsors
October 25, 1973 1:30 p.m.

Adopted
approx 1530, 10/25

"The Security Council

"Recalling its resolutions 338 of 21st October 1973
and 339 of 23rd October 1973,

"Noting with regret the reported repeated violations
of the ceasefire in non-compliance with the
resolutions 338 and 339,

"Noting with concern from the Secretary-General's
report that the United Nations observers have not yet
been able to place themselves on both sides of the
ceasefire line,

"(1) Demands that immediate and complete ceasefire
be observed and that the parties return to the
positions occupied by them at 5-50 GMT on 22nd
October 1973, 1650

"(2) Requests the Secretary-General, as an immediate
step, to increase the number of UN observers on both
sides,

"(3) Decides to set up immediately a United Nations
Emergency Force under its authority, to be composed
of personnel to be drawn from states members of the
UN except the permanent members of the SC, and requests
the Secretary-General to report within 24 hours on
the steps taken to this effect,

"(4) Requests the Secretary-General to report to the
Council on an urgent and continuing basis of the
state of implementation of this resolution as well as
resolutions 338 and 339,

"(5) Requests all member states to extend their full
cooperation to the UN in the implementation of this
resolution as well as resolutions 338 and 339."

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center

MIDDLE EAST TASK FORCE
Situation Report #63

Situation Report in the Middle East as of 1200 EDT, 10/25/73

Cease-Fire

The second cease fire seems to be firming up. The IDF Liaison Officer has agreed in principle with the Chief UN Observer to place observers along Syrian front lines; the IDF is ready to begin discussions about practical arrangements on the Sinai front. There have been several Israeli reports of cease fire violations in Sinai. One occurred at the southern tip of the Great Bitter Lake with 15 Israeli WIA; subsequently Egyptian troops were seen crossing the canal in rubber rafts from west to east. Military sources in Israel report that thousands of Egyptian soldiers are surrendering in the southern section of the Suez Canal's western side. Action on the Lebanese border centered in the Arqub area, but activity has slackened. An exchange of small arms fire has occurred east of Blida.

United Nations

We have instructed USUN to negotiate several changes in the eight-power resolution. The first paragraph would read "Demands that immediate and complete cease-fire be observed and that the parties return to the positions occupied by them at 1750 GMT on October 22, 1973." The third paragraph would read "Decides to set up immediately, under its authority, a UN Emergency Force to be composed of personnel drawn from states members of the UN except permanent members of the Security Council and requests the Secretary General to report within 24 hours on steps taken to this effect."

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GDS - DECLASS Dec. 31, 1981

SECRET/EXDIS

2.

Re-Supply

Embassy Bonn reports that all planned sea shipments to Israel (with the exception of 50 trucks) will be concluded upon the departure of the PALMA, an Israeli vessel now in Bremen awaiting instructions. USEUCOM began air shipping 105 mm artillery ammunition on October 23 and plans to continue until October 27. The FRG is aware of the sea shipments but has not been informed of air shipments of ammunition to Israel.

Syrian Situation

Embassy Beirut confirms previous Amman reports that the general feeling in the Syrian army is that the SARG should not have accepted the cease-fire. Civilian morale remains high with determination to wage "popular war" despite heavy damage to economic sector. While President Assad's position was strengthened by Syria's participation in the war and the army's relative success, his capacity to hold on will be weakened if he cannot show visible political gains from his acceptance of the cease-fire. A complicating factor is the growing presence of Iraqi forces in Syria, now in excess of two divisions. Iraq has not accepted the cease-fire and Jordanian army sources believe Iraqi forces in Syria could draw on the support of leftist Baath Syrians and fedayeen organizations which are seeking to topple the present Syrian regime. X

Israeli Situation

Defense Minister Dayan offered his resignation today in reaction to criticism of Israel's military preparedness and conduct of the Middle East war.

Japanese Situation

The GOJ is almost ready to reply to the Arab note verbale of October 19 urging strong Japanese support of the Arab cause. However, the GOJ does not expect that its reply, which will paraphrase SC Resolution 242 and be accompanied by an oral statement supporting Israeli withdrawal from "all" occupied territories, will be enough to satisfy the Arabs. In such a case, the GOJ will probably seek consultations with the USG in the very near future.

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3.

US Alert

There have been numerous Congressional and public inquiries on the veracity and significance of press reports that the US placed a number of quick-reaction military forces on a state of alert. We have not commented on the reports and advised all callers that the Secretary would address himself to this question at a press conference at noon.

Oil

Oil company sources report : that Saudi Arabia has ordered that US military vessels and vessels chartered by the US military are not to be bunkered in Saudi ports. ✓

DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
APPROVED BY: <i>W. E. B.</i>
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS

SECRET/EXDIS

COPY 11 OF 15 COPIES



Department of State

SECRET

TELEGRAM

CONTROL: 7086Q
RECD: 25 OCT 73 12:05AM

O 250203Z OCT 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE 4997
BT
SECRET STATE 210442

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFCR, ME, JC
SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO KING HUSSEIN FROM SECRETARY

REF: AMMAN 5682

1. PLEASE PASS FOLLOWING TO KING FROM SECRETARY.
2. QUOTE. YOUR MAJESTY:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR MESSAGE CONVEYED TO ME TODAY BY AMBASSADOR BROWN. I TRULY APPRECIATE ALL THAT YOU HAVE DONE TO BRING SYRIA TO ACCEPT THE CEASEFIRE. THIS IS QUITE IMPORTANT IF WE ARE TO BE ABLE TO MAKE PROGRESS TOWARD OUR GOAL OF A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT.

I SHARE YOUR CONCERN OVER THE DELICATE SITUATION CREATED BY THE PRESENCE OF A LARGE IRAQI FORCE IN SYRIA AND THE POTENTIAL DANGER THAT THIS FORCE POSES FOR THE CEASEFIRE. I HOPE YOU WILL CONTINUE TO URGE THE SYRIANS, IN THEIR OWN INTEREST, TO HOLD STEADFASTLY TO THE CEASEFIRE AND NOT TO ALLOW THEMSELVES TO BE SWAYED BY IRAQI DEMAGOGUERY.

THE CHOICE YOU FACE IN REGARD TO LEAVING YOUR FORCES IN SYRIA, OR WITHDRAWING THEM NOW THAT THE CEASEFIRE HAS BEEN AGREED UPON, IS INDEED DIFFICULT. THIS IS OF COURSE A DECISION ONLY YOUR MAJESTY CAN MAKE. MY OWN ADVICE TO YOU, HOWEVER, IS THAT YOU SHOULD WITHDRAW YOUR UNITS FROM

SYRIA. THIS WOULD BE SUPPORTIVE OF THE CEASEFIRE CALLED FOR IN SC RESOLUTION 338 AND WOULD AVOID THE DANGER OF THEIR BEING DRAWN INTO VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASEFIRE BY THE IRAQIS OR THE SYRIANS.

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WAR
25 Oct



Department of State

SECRET

TELEGRAM

PAGE -2- STATE 210442, OCT 25

I AM FULLY SYMPATHETIC WITH YOUR REQUEST FOR REPLACEMENT OF MILITARY EQUIPMENT YOU HAVE LOST. I HAVE ASKED OUR EXPERTS TO LOOK AT THIS ON AN URGENT BASIS AND WILL BE IN FURTHER TOUCH WITH YOU AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. SINCERELY, HENRY A. KISSINGER. UNQUOTE. KISSINGER

DRAFTED BY: NEA;DAKORN/ALATHERTON

APPROVED BY: THE SECRETARY

CLEARANCES: NEA:JJSISCO

S/S:TRPICKERING

SECRET

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

War

Oct 25

SECRET 316

PAGE 01 STATE 210441

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NSAE-00 DODE-00 /031 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/IA:HHSTACKHOUSE/S:LEAGLEBURGER:KM
APPROVED BY S: THE SECRETARY
NEA:JJSISCO (DRAFT)
DOS/ISA:MR.BLITGEN (DRAFT)
EUR:MR.LEDSKY
S/S:MR.PICKERING
EUR:WSTABLER
EUR:MR.SPRINGSTEEN

ANDERSON _____
HOLDRIDGE _____
HORMATS _____
JORDEN _____
KENNEDY _____
LEHMAN _____
LEVINE _____
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RATLIEF _____
RONDON _____
SANDERS _____
SONNENFELD _____
V.L.G. _____
WALSH _____

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TO AMEMBASSY BONN NIACT IMMEDIATE

SECRET STATE 210441

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, XF, GW
SUBJ: US ARMS SHIPMENTS FROM FRG TO ME: FRG CONCERN

REF: A. BONN 15333; B. BONN 15408

1. WE ARE MOST CONCERNED BY FRG POSITION AS OUTLINED BY FRANK AND REQUEST THAT STRONG DEMARCHE BE MADE TO FRANK ALONG FOLLOWING LINES:
2. YOU SHOULD INFORM FRANK THAT USG WELCOMED FRG UNDERSTANDING AND COOPERATION IN NOT INTERPOSING OBJECTION OUR SHIPPING ARMS TO ISRAEL FROM USG STOCKS IN FRG. THIS HAS BEEN GREAT CONTRIBUTION TO STABILIZING SITUATION IN AREA AND TO ESTABLISHING CONDITIONS PROPITIOUS FOR CEASEFIRE. UNFORTUNATELY, THERE NO AGREEMENT WITH SOVIETS ON ARMS SHIPMENTS LIMITATIONS AND THEY ARE CONTINUING ARMS SHIPMENTS

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Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET


PAGE 02 STATE 210441

TO SYRIA AND EGYPT. WE HAVE PUBLICLY SAID THAT WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO DISCUSS A REDUCTION IN THE EMERGENCY RESUPPLY WITH THE USSR. THUS FAR THERE HAS BEEN NO RESPONSE.

3. THUS THE USG IS EXTREMELY CONCERNED AT THIS LATEST TURN IN FRG ATTITUDES TOWARD RESUPPLY OF ISRAEL. THE USG BELIEVES THAT FOR THE WEST TO DISPLAY WEAKNESS

AND DISUNITY IN THE FACE OF A SOVIET-SUPPORTED MILITARY ACTION AGAINST ISRAEL COULD HAVE DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES. THE UNITED STATES HAS HAD NO CHOICE BUT TO PROVIDE ISRAEL WITH THE MILITARY SUPPLIES NECESSARY TO DEFEND ITSELF; THE USG WILL CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN ITS SUPPLY EFFORT.

4. THE POLICIES PURSUED BY THE USG IN SEEKING TO BRING AN END TO THE CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST HAVE THUS FAR SUCCEEDED, DESPITE THE FAILURE OF SOME OF OUR WESTERN EUROPEAN ALLIES TO SUPPORT THOSE POLICIES. THE FRG SHOULD KNOW THAT THE USG WILL NOT FORGET THE ATTITUDES TAKEN BY ITS ALLIES IN THIS TIME OF CRISIS. KISSINGER



Department of State

SECRET

COPY 10 OF 15 COPIES

W 13
TELETYPE

25 1012Z OCT 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION NATO FLASH 0587
BT
SECRET STATE 210450

CONTROL: 7166Q
RECD: 25 OCT 73 7:30AM

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY

FOR AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD FROM THE SECRETARY

PLEASE URGENTLY INFORM LUNS AND PERMREPS ON COMPLETELY
CONFIDENTIAL BASIS AS FOLLOWS.

1. AS THEY ARE AWARE THE EGYPTIANS HAVE PROPOSED INTRODUCTION OF US AND SOVIET FORCES IN THE AREA OF THE CONFLICT. THE SOVIETS HAVE SUPPORTED THIS PROPOSAL. IN ADDITION WE HAVE RECEIVED INDICATIONS THAT SOVIETS MAY BE CONSIDERING UNILATERAL INTERVENTION.
2. WE ARE INFORMING SOVIETS THAT INTRODUCTION OF US AND SOVIET MILITARY CONTINGENTS IS INAPPROPRIATE BUT THAT WE ARE READY TO SUPPORT INCREASE IN SUPERVISORY FORCE, INCLUDING, AS AN EXTRAORDINARY AND TEMPORARY MEASURE, SOME US AND SOVIET PERSONNEL. FUNCTION WOULD BE SOLELY SUPERVISORY AND ACQUISITION OF ACCURATE INFORMATION REGARDING COMPLIANCE OF THE TWO SIDES WITH THE CEASEFIRE.
3. AT THE SAME TIME, WE HAVE MADE CLEAR THAT ANY UNILATERAL INTERVENTION BY THE SOVIETS IS WHOLLY UNACCEPTABLE TO US.
4. AS A PRECAUTIONARY MEASURE WE HAVE UNDERTAKEN CERTAIN ALERT MEASURES IN OUR MILITARY FORCES AROUND THE WORLD, INCLUDING EUROPE.
5. WE ARE OF COURSE IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH ISRAELIS TO ENSURE THEIR COMPLIANCE WITH THE CEASEFIRE AND ARE CONFIDENT THAT OUR POSITION WILL BRING THE FIGHTING TO A CONCLUSION.

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Department of State
SECRET

TELEGRAM

PAGE -2- STATE 210450, OCT 25

6. WE HOPE WE CAN COUNT ON FULL NATO SUPPORT FOR OUR ACTIONS IN THIS SITUATION. OUR SOLE PURPOSE IS TO END THE FIGHTING AND LAY THE BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS LEADING TO A SETTLEMENT AND PREVENT UNILATERAL SOVIET ACTIONS WHICH WOULD REPRESENT GRAVE THREAT TO PEACE.

7. PLEASE ENSURE THAT YOUR COLLEAGUES UNDERSTAND THAT WE DO NOT REPEAT NOT WANT A PUBLIC CONFRONTATION WITH THE SOVIETS AND THAT THEREFORE THE INFORMATION YOU HAVE CONVEYED MUST BE KEPT TOTALLY CONFIDENTIAL. ✓

KISSINGER

DRAFTED BY: TEXT AS RECEIVED FROM WHITE HOUSE

APPROVED BY: S-THE SECRETARY

CLEARANCE: S/S-O:RMWRIGHT

SECRET

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TRANSMITTED BY:
(Date & Time Stamp)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OPERATIONS CENTER

OCT 25 11:29
W. J. ...

URGENT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center

LDX MESSAGE RECEIPT

S/S #

RECEIVED BY:
(Date & Time Stamp)

WHITE HOUSE
SITUATION ROOM

'73 OCT 25 AM 11:44

LDX MESSAGE NO. 609, CLASSIFICATION SECRET NODIS, NO. PAGES 1

DESCRIPTION OF MSG. JIDDA 47L2

FROM: MR. GAMMON, S/S, 23126, Room Number
Officer Office Symbol Extension

LDX TO: DELIVER TO: EXTENSION: ROOM NUMBER:

WHITE HOUSE GEN. SCOWCROFT, EXTENSION: ROOM NUMBER:

FOR: CLEARANCE ☐ INFORMATION ☐ PER REQUEST ☐ COMMENT ☐

REMARKS: _____

VALIDATED FOR TRANSMISSION BY: SRV
Executive Secretariat Officer



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

CONTROL: 7223Q
RECD: OCT 25, 1973
1408Z

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FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA
SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5298
BT
SECRET JIDDA 4712

NODIS

E.O. 11652: CDS
TAGS: PFOR, SA, XF
SUBJ: LETTER FROM KING TO PRESIDENT NIXON OCTOBER 25
REF: JIDDA 4657 (NODIS)

1. AMBASSADOR WAS CALLED TO FOREIGN MINISTRY AT 2:30 PM TODAY (1130Z) WITH SHORT URGENT MESSAGE FROM KING TO PRESIDENT. ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER, MAS'UD, SAID KING HAD PERSONALLY DICTATED MESSAGE ON PHONE AN HOUR EARLIER. MAS'UD SAID KING WAS DISTURBED AND DEPRESSED AT APPARENT AMERICAN UNWILLINGNESS TO UNDERSTAND THAT ITS STRONG UNCONDITIONAL SUPPORT OF ISRAEL, WITH NO COMMITMENT FROM ISRAEL TO WITHDRAW FROM ARAB LANDS, WAS RAPIDLY TURNING ENTIRE AREA OVER TO RUSSIANS AND COMMUNISM.

2. EMBASSY TRANSLATION OF LETTER FOLLOWS; ORIGINAL POUCHED TO STATE, ATTN. NEA/ARP.

QUOTE HIS EXCELLENCY PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON

THE SITUATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST IS DETERIORATING RAPIDLY; THIS IS NOT IN THE INTEREST OF ANYONE AND WILL LEAD TO A CONFLICT BETWEEN THE GREAT POWERS AT THE EXPENSE OF THE PEOPLES OF THE REGION. ONE OF THE RESULTS OF THIS CONFLICT WILL BE THE SPREAD OF COMMUNISM IN THE AREA. THEREFORE, WE DO EXPECT THAT YOU WILL TAKE A RESOLUTE STAND TOWARD ISRAEL IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF 22/23 OCTOBER 1973, AND COMPELLING HER TO WITHDRAW FROM ALL OCCUPIED ARAB TERRITORIES. (SIGNED) FAISAL 29/9/93 AH; 25/10/73 AD.
UNQUOTE.

AKINS

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Department of State
SECRET

TELEGRAM

Wav¹⁰
2804

Z 251735Z OCT 73
FM USMISSION NATO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 2339
BT
SECRET USNATO 5133

7 2 8 7 Q
Oct 25, 1973
18:35Z

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3
TAGS: PFOR, XF, NATO
SUBJ: US ACTIONS REGARDING MIDDLE EAST

REF: A. STATE 210443 B. STATE 210450

1. AT CONCLUSION OF TODAY'S REGILAC NOON RESTRICTED BRIEFING, FOR PERMREPS ON MIDDLE EAST, RUMSFELD INFORMED COUNCIL THAT GENERALS GOODPASTER AND MILTON HAD THAT MORNING NOTIFIED THE APPROPRIATE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES THAT THE U.S. HAD TAKEN CERTAIN PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES. HE ADDED THAT HE MIGHT MRECEIVE GUIDANCE LATER TODAY AND IF SO WOULD ADVISE NAC PROMPTLY. ABOUT AN HOUR EARLIER THEY HAD RECEIVED FIRST WORD OF U.S. ACTION THROUGH AP TICKER FROM WASHINGTON. RUMSFELD SUGGESTED THAT NATO PRESS SPOKESMAN, IF ASKED, GIVE "NO COMMENT" RESPONSE SAME AS U.S. SPOKESMEN.

2. GENERAL STEINHOFF (CHAIRMAN MILITARY COMMITTEE) REPORTED THAT SOVIETS HAD FLOWN SIX AN-22 HEAVY TRANSPORT AIRCRAFT INTO CAIRO CAPABLE OF CARRYING 900 TROOPS, BUT CARGO WAS UNKNOWN. ACCORDING TO STEINHOFF, GENERAL GOODPASTER ADVISED HIM U.S. HAD TAKEN WORLDWIDE PRECAUTIONARY ALERT. HE SAW NO NEED AT THIS TIME FOR NATO MEASURES; SACEUR WILL SEND REQUEST TO COUNCIL IMMEDIATELY IF INCREASED NATO MILITARY VIGILANCE IS NEEDED.

3. DE STAERCCKE, SEEKING INFORMATION, ASKED THAT ACTING SECRETARY GENERAL PANSA (LUNS IN ANKARA ATTENDING NORTH ATLANTIC ASSEMBLY) READ SUMMARY OF RECENT PRESS REPORTS. RUMSFELD INTERVENED, SUGGESTING THAT PRESS REPORTS-- WHICH WERE ALL OVER THE LOT--BE CAREFULLY DISTINGUISHED FROM HIS REMARKS AND THOSE OF GENERAL STEINHOFF.

DE STAERCCKE AND ERALP QUESTIONED NATO "NO COMMENT" SUGGESTION BY RUMSFELD. DE STAERCCKE SAID THAT FIRST THING HE HAD SEEN WAS IN NEWSPAPERS, AND WHOLE WORLD KNEW AS MUCH AS COUNCIL.

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Department of State
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TELEGRAM

-2- USNATO 5133, Oct 25

4. AT THIS POINT REFTEL B. ARRIVED. ROOM WAS CLEARED OF ALL EXCEPT PERMREPS AND CHAIRMAN MILITARY COMMITTEE. RUMSFELD DREW FULLY ON REFTEL. RUMSFELD DECLINED TO PROVIDE TEXT OF HIS REMARKS AND EMPHASIZED NEED TO ASSURE CONFIDENTIALITY.

5. AFTER FURTHER DISCUSSION, NAC AGREED STAND READY TO MEET LATER ON OCTOBER 25 IF EVENTS WARRANTED, OR AT CALL OF ANY DELEGATION. NEXT NAC MIDDLE EAST BRIEFING SCHEDULED FOR 10:00 A.M. OCTOBER 26.

6. COMMENT: STATE 210450 ARRIVED ON SCHEDULE AND IN THE NICK OF TIME. MY COLLEAGUES, ALTHOUGH NOT FULLY SATISFIED THAT THEY UNDERSTOOD WHY USG HAS ALERTED ITS ARMED FORCES ROUND THE WORLD, WERE OBVIOUSLY REASSURED BY PROMPT EXPOSITION OF WASHINGTON'S POLICY OBJECTIVES AND MOVED WITH ALACRITY TO INFORM THEIR CAPITALS. ATTITUDE IN COUNCIL REMAINS GOOD-- EVEN WITHOUT HELPFUL PRESENCE OF LUNS. ADDITIONAL INSTRUCTIONS PRIOR TO OCTOBER 26 NAC WOULD STRENGTHEN SUPPORT FOR U.S. POSITION MATERIALLY. RUMSFELD

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TELEGRAM

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE 934

25 Oct

PAGE 01 USUN N 04188 250758Z

21 11
ACTION IO-14

INFO OCT-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00
NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 ACDA-19 IO-14
NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00 USSS-00 INRE-00 CCO-00 OMB-01
AID-20 TRSE-00 ISO-00 DRC-01 /118 W
----- 072209

O P 250710Z OCT 73
FM USMISSION USUN NY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0479
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
USINT CAIRO PRIORITY
AMCONGEN JERUSALEM PRIORITY
USLO PEKING PRIORITY
AMCONGEN HONG KONG PRIORITY

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE USUN 4188

E.O. 11652: DECLASSIFY OCTOBER 25, 1974
TAGS: PFOR, UN, XF
SUBJ: SC MEETING ON MIDDLE EAST, OCTOBER 24-25

1. SECURITY COUNCIL MET FOR SIX HOURS NIGHT OF OCTOBER 24-25
AT EGYPT'S REQUEST TO CONSIDER CONTINUING VIOLATIONS OF
CEASE-FIRE. AT CLOSE OF MEETING, NON-ALIGNED TABLED
DRAFT RES (SEPTTEL) ASKING SYG TO INCREASE NUMBER OF UN OBSERVERS
AND DECIDING "TO SET UP IMMEDIATELY A UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY
FORCE UNDER (SC) AUTHORITY." COUNCIL WILL MEET 10:30 A.M.
OCTOBER 25 TO CONSIDER FURTHER AND VOTE ON DRAFT.

2. EGYPT CLAIMED ISRAELI VIOLATIONS WERE SO GRAVE AS TO

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PAGE 02 USUN N 04188 250758Z

CONSTITUTE "A NEW WAR," NOT SIMPLY BREAKDOWN OF CEASE-FIRE. ON OTHER HAND, ISRAEL INSISTED THAT AFTER EARLY FIGHTING ON OCTOBER 24, PRECIPITATED BY EGYPTIAN EFFORT TO BREAK OUT OF ISRAELI MILITARY ENCIRCLEMENT, CEASE-FIRE HAD TAKEN HOLD.

3. THROUGHOUT EVENING, DEBATE FOCUSED ON EGYPTIAN DEMAND THAT US AND USSR FACE UP TO THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES AS CO-SPONSORS OF EARLIER CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTION AND ENSURE COMPLIANCE. EGYPT REQUESTED TWO POWERS TO INTERVENE USING FORCES IN MEDITERRANEAN TO BRING PARTIES BACK TO WHERE THEY WERE WHEN CEASE-FIRE TOOK EFFECT. NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS GENERALLY TOOK TACK THAT US AND USSR HAD SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY TO SEE THEIR RESOLUTION IMPLEMENTED, WHILE AVOIDING QUESTION OF USING US AND SOVIET FORCES. SOVIETS (MALIK) ALSO DUCKED ISSUE, INSISTING ONLY THAT US HAD RESPONSIBILITY TO FORCE ISRAEL TO COMPLY WITH CEASE-FIRE. USSR ALSO SAID TIME HAD COME FOR ADOPTION OF APPROPRIATE STRICT SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL, ATTACKED UN FOR SLOWNESS IN GETTING OBSERVERS TO CEASE-FIRE LINES, AND CRITICIZED COMPOSITION OF UNTSO AS UNBALANCED. MALIK ASKED THAT ALL STATES BREAK RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL.

4. TEXT OF AMB. SCALI'S STATEMENT BEING SENT SEPTTEL.
SCALI

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2502

UNCLASSIFIED 904

PAGE 01 USUN N 04183 250716Z

21 11
ACTION IO-14

INFO OCT-01 AF-10 ARA-16 EA-11 EUR-25 NEA-10 RSC-01 ISO-00
CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10
PA-04 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-20 ACDA-19 NSCE-00 SSO-00
USIE-00 USSS-00 INRE-00 CCO-00 OMB-01 AID-20 TRSE-00

/189 W

072002

O P 250622Z OCT 73
FM USMISSION USUN NY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0474
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY
USINT CAIRO PRIORITY
AMCONGEN JERUSALEM PRIORITY
USLO PEKING
AMCONGEN HONG KONG

UNCLAS USUN 4183

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: PFOR, UN, XF
SUBJ: NON-ALIGNED DRAFT RESOLUTION ON ME

REF: USUN 4177 (NOTAL)

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION TABLED BY NON-ALIGNED
AT CONCLUSION OF SC MEETING EARLY MORNING OCTOBER 25.
SPONSORS WERE INDIA, INDONESIA, GUINEA, YUGOSLAVIA, SUDAN,
PERU, PANAMA, AND KENYA.

"THE SECURITY COUNCIL

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PAGE 02 USUN N 04183 250716Z

"RECALLING ITS RESOLUTIONS 338 OF 21ST OCTOBER 1973
AND 339 OF 23RD OCTOBER 1973,

"NOTING WITH REGRET THE REPORTED REPEATED VIOLATIONS OF
THE CEASEFIRE IN NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE RESOLUTIONS 338 AND
339,

"NOTING WITH CONCERN FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S
REPORT THAT THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS HAVE NOT YET
BEEN ABLE TO PLACE THEMSELVES ON BOTH SIDES OF THE
CEASEFIRE LINE,

"(1) DEMANDS THAT IMMEDIATE AND COMPLETE CEASEFIRE
BE OBSERVED AND THAT THE PARTIES WITHDRAW TO THE POSI-
TIONS OCCUPIED BY THEM AT 5,50 GMT ON 22ND OCTOBER 1973,

"(2) REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, AS AN IMMEDIATE
STEP, TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF UN OBSERVERS ON BOTH
SIDES,

"(3) DECIDES TO SET UP IMMEDIATELY A UNITED
NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE UNDER ITS AUTHORITY, AND
REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT WITHIN 24 HOURS
ON THE STEPS TAKEN TO THIS EFFECT,

"(4) REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE
COUNCIL ON AN URGENT AND CONTINUING BASIS OF THE STATE OF
IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION AS WELL AS RESOLUTIONS
338 AND 339.

"(5) REQUESTS ALL MEMBER STATES TO EXTEND THEIR FULL
COOPERATION IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION AS
WELL AS RESOLUTIONS 338 AND 339."
SCALI

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Department of State

War
TELEGRAM
U.N. Nations

UNCLASSIFIED 600

PAGE 01 USUN N 04177 250442Z

20

ACTION IO-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 AF-10 ARA-16 EA-11 EUR-25 NEA-10 RSC-01

CIAE-00 DODE-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00 CCO-00

INRE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSC-10 PA-04 PRS-01

SPC-03 SS-20 ACDA-19 OMB-01 DRC-01 MC-02 /172 W
071351

O 250359Z OCT 73

FM USMISSION USUN NY

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0466

UNCLAS USUN 4177

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PFOR, UN, XF

SUBJ: SC ON ME, OCTOBER 24

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION EXPECTED TO BE
TABLED BY NONALIGNED UN RESUMPTION OF SC MEETING TONIGHT:

"THE SECURITY COUNCIL

"RECALLING ITS RESOLUTIONS 338 OF 21ST OCTOBER
1973 AND 339 OF 23RD OCTOBER, 1973,

"NOTING WITH REGRET THE REPORTED REPEATED
VIOLATIONS OF THE CEASEFIRE IN NON-COMPLIANCE WITH
THE RESOLUTIONS 338 AND 339,

"NOTING WITH CONCERN FROM THE SECRETARY-
GENERAL'S REPORT THAT THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS
HAVE NOT YET BEEN ENABLED TO PLACE THEMSELVES ON
BOTH SIDES OF THE CEASEFIRE LINE,

"(1) DEMANDS THAT IMMEDIATE AND COMPLETE
CEASEFIRE BE OBSERVED AND THAT THE PARTIES WITHDRAW
TO THE POSITIONS OCCUPIED BY THEM AT 5.50 GMT ON

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 USUN N 04177 250442Z

22ND OCTOBER, 1973,

"(2) REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, AS AN IMMEDIATE STEP TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF UN OBSERVERS ON BOTH SIDES,

"(3) DECIDES TO SET UP IMMEDIATELY A UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AND AUTHORIZES THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO DESPATCH IT FORTHWITH TO THE AREA,

"(4) REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE COUNCIL ON AN URGENT AND CONTINUING BASIS OF THE STATE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION AS WELL AS RESOLUTIONS 338 AND 339,

"(5) REQUESTS ALL MEMBER STATES TO EXTEND THEIR FULL COOPERATION IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION AS WELL AS RESOLUTIONS 338 AND 339."

SCALI

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

CONFIDENTIAL 889

PAGE 01 USUN N 04181 250658Z

21 11
ACTION IO-14

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 DRC-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03
INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-10 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03
SS-20 ACDA-19 NSCE-00 SSO-00 USIE-00 AF-10 ARA-16
EA-11 EUR-25 NEA-10 USSS-00 INRE-00 CCO-00 OMB-01
AID-20 TRSE-00 /190 W
***** 071908

O 250612Z OCT 73
FM USMISSION USUN NY
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0472

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN 4181

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: XF UNSC PFOR
SUBJ: SC MIDDLE EAST RESOLUTION

1. THIS TELEGRAM DEALS ONLY WITH OP PARA 3 OF DRAFT NON-ALIGNED RES TABLED SC MORNING OCT 25.
2. AT FIRST GLANCE THIS PARA RAISES FOLLOWING SERIOUS QUESTIONS:
 - A) IT ESTABLISHES UN EMERGENCY FORCE BUT DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR ITS USE.
 - B) IT ESTABLISHES UNEF WHICH CONCEIVABLY COULD BE OPERATING PARALLEL TO ENLARGED UNTSQ GROUP.
 - C) IT ESTABLISHES UNEF "UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL" WHICH COULD BE INTERPRETED AS CONTRARY TO US VIEW OF PEACEKEEPING.
 - D) IS POTENTIAL REMINDER OF EVENTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF PREVIOUS UNEF IN 1967, WHICH HELPED PRECIPITATE 1967 WAR.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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PAGE 02 USUN N 04181 250658Z

2. HOWEVER, ALTHOUGH WORDS "TO SET UP" ARE UNFORTUNATE THE PARA DOES NOT COMMIT SC TO SEND A UNEF TO MIDDLE EAST AND THAT DECISION REMAINS TO BE MADE. FURTHERMORE, USE OF THE WORD "AUTHORITY" RATHER THAN "CONTROL" LEAVES A CERTAIN AMOUNT OF AMBIGUITY ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE SC IN OPERATIONS OF SUCH A FORCE AS OPPOSED TO THAT OF SYG.

3. THEREFORE, ONE CAN ARGUE THAT THE FINAL ESTABLISHMENT AND DISPATCH OF A UNEF TO THE MIDDLE EAST WOULD REQUIRE FURTHER VETOABLE SC ACTION WHICH WOULD DEFINE THE MANDATE AND PRESUMABLY INCLUDE OTHER PROVISIONS SUCH AS FORCE COMPOSITION, COMMANDER, HOST COUNTRY AGREEMENTS AND AGREEMENTS WITH CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES. THIS IS THE WAY IN WHICH UK INTERPRETS THE PARA. UK AT THIS POINT IS INCLINED TO ACCEPT IT.

4. IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO SUBSTITUTE A NEW PARA AS FOLLOWS:
"REQUESTS THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL DRAW UP A PLAN FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE AND SUBMIT IT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITHIN 24 (OR 48) HOURS."

5. THIS IN FACT MAY BE WHAT AT LEAST SOME OF THE SPONSORS INTENDED AND IS A MUCH MORE LOGICAL STEP THAN SETTING UP AN EMERGENCY FORCE AND DECIDING LATER WHETHER TO USE IT.

6. OUR SOUNDINGS INDICATE THAT ALL OTHER SC MEMBERS WOULD PROBABLY VOTE FOR RES AS IT STANDS, PUTTING US IN A POSITION OF SPLENDID ISOLATION. WE THEREFORE URGENTLY PROPOSE THAT WE BE AUTHORIZED AT OPENING OF BUSINESS OCT 25 TO SEEK AGREEMENT FOR SUGGESTED NEW LANGUAGE PARA 4 ABOVE. IF THIS PROVES UNSALABLE, WE SUGGEST THAT DEPT ALSO SERIOUSLY CONSIDER ACCEPTING PRESENT LANGUAGE WITH EXPLANATION OF WHAT WE INTERPRET THIS LANGUAGE TO MEAN AS IN PARA 3 ABOVE.

SCALI

CONFIDENTIAL



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

CONTROL: 7221Q
RECD: OCT 25, 1973
1407Z

7 251310Z OCT 73
FM USINT CAIRO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 4115
BT
SECRET CAIRO 3242

NODIS

EO 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: PFOR US UR EC IS
SUBJECT: SOVIET QUESTION ON US AND ISRAELI MOTIVES

REF: CAIRO 3120

1. DEPUTY TASS DIRECTOR YEDRASHNIKOV ASKED TO SEE USINTCFF (MCUGHTON) OCTOBER 25 FOR WHAT HE SAID WOULD BE BRIEF BUT NECESSARY DISCUSSION OF QI SITUATION.
2. AT MEETING, YEDRASHNIKOV LED WITH REVIEW OF PRESENT MILITARY SITUATION WHICH LEFT ISRAELIS IN LARGE NUMBERS IN CONTROL OF LARGE PARTS OF EGYPTIAN TERRITORY TO WEST OF CANAL.
3. YEDRASHNIKOV ASKED WHAT WAS ISRAEL'S PURPOSE? MORE TO THE POINT, DID US SEE THAT ISRAELI INCURSION INTO EGYPT SERVED US PURPOSES? YEDRASHNIKOV SAID IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE THAT ISRAELIS WERE ACTING ON THEIR OWN, BUT HE DID WANT TO KNOW WHETHER US MIGHT HAVE REACHED AGREEMENT WITH ISRAEL WHEREBY LATTER WOULD GO AS FAR AS IT COULD TO DISMANTLE THE EGYPTIAN ARMY.
4. YEDRASHNIKOV REFERRED TO AGREEMENT REACHED IN MOSCOW BETWEEN SECRETARY KISSINGER AND SOVIET LEADERS. HE UNDERSTOOD THAT THIS AGREEMENT PROVIDED QUITE DEFINITELY FOR THE WITHDRAWAL BY ISRAELI FORCES FROM ALL EGYPTIAN TERRITORIES OCCUPIED SINCE JUNE OF 1967. THEREAFTER, US AND SOVIET FORCES WOULD GUARANTEE ISRAELI/EGYPTIAN BORDERS AND BE PART OF ARRANGEMENT FOR CERTAIN AREAS OF OCCUPIED TERRITORIES SUCH AS SHARM EL SHEIKH AND GOLAN HEIGHTS.

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Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

-2-CAIRO 3242, OCT 73

5. YEDRASHNIKOV ASKED AGAIN AS TO REASONS BEHIND ISRAELIS APPARENT INSISTENCE ON TAKING MORE EGYPTIAN TERRITORY AND MOVING TO DESTROY EGYPTIAN ARMY. AS IT STOOD NOW, SITUATION WAS DIFFICULT ENOUGH. SADAT HAD SUMMONED SOVIET AMBASSADOR VINOGRADOV ON OCTOBER 23 IN A NEARLY HYSTERICAL FRAME OF MIND AND HAD PERATED HIM FOR INSUFFICIENT SOVIET SUPPORT FOR EGYPT. SADAT HAD INSISTED AT THAT TIME THAT EGYPT BE SUPPLIED WITH SOVIET TROOPS. YEDRASHNIKOV SAID VINOGRADOV HAD RETURNED ON OCTOBER 24 TO TELL SADAT THAT SOVIET RESUPPLY OF AMMUNITION AND SPARES WOULD CONTINUE AS NECESSARY BUT THAT SOVIET TROOPS WOULD NOT BE SENT TO EGYPT.

6. YEDRASHNIKOV CONTINUED THAT OUTCOME OF PRESENT SITUATION WAS UNCLEAR BUT, IF EGYPT COULD CLAIM ONLY DEFEAT AS RESULT OF THIS WAR, EGYPTIANS WOULD SEEK A SCAPEGOAT. YEDRASHNIKOV SAID HE BELIEVED THIS SCAPEGOAT WOULD BE THE SOVIET UNION. HE IMPLIED THAT SADAT HAD ALREADY MADE THIS POINT CLEAR DURING HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH VINOGRADOV.

7. IN RESPONSE TO QUESTION ABOUT EXTENT OF PRESENT SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE IN EGYPT, YEDRASHNIKOV SAID IT WAS LIMITED TO SEVERAL HUNDRED TECHNICIANS, WHO WERE MOSTLY INVOLVED IN REPAIRING AND MAINTAINING SOPHISTICATED EQUIPMENT. HE SAID HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER OR NOT MIG-25'S WERE PRESENTLY IN EGYPT, BUT THOUGHT THIS NOT UNLIKELY. THEY WERE FOR RECONNAISSANCE PURPOSES ONLY, IN ANY CASE. HE CONCLUDED THAT HE DID NOT BELIEVE USSR WOULD SEND TROOPS TO EGYPT OVER AND ABOVE THOSE REQUIRED TO POLICE CEASEFIRE, AS AGREED UPON IN MOSCOW.

SMITH

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DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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Department of State

SECRET

TELEGRAM

25 Oct

Z 25 1145Z OCT 73 ZHH-4
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO SECSTATE WASHDC FLASH 9839
BT
SECRET AMMAN 5691

CONTROL: 7 1 7 0 Q
RECD: 25 OCT 73Z 11 55

NODIS

E.O. 11652: XGDS
TAGS: PFOR, MO, JO
SUBJECT: MESSAGE FOR KING HUSSEIN FROM SECRETARY

REF: STATE 210442

1. I DELIVERED SECRETARY'S MESSAGE TO KING THIS MORNING. HE SAID HE WANTED TO REFLECT ON IT AND WOULD BE IN TOUCH LATER. HE IS DISAPPOINTED THAT WE HAVE NOT GIVEN HIM GREEN LIGHT TO STAY ON IN SYRIA. SAID THAT IF HE WITHDRAWS AND THINGS GO BAD, THEN WE WILL ALL HAVE TO SHOULDER OUR RESPONSIBILITIES.
2. I TOLD HIM THAT, WHILE HIS PRESENCE MIGHT HAVE A STABILIZING EFFECT IT NOT OF SIZE NOR COULD IT BE OF SIZE TO BE DECISIVE. THIS HAS TO BE WEIGHED AGAINST DANGER TO JORDAN OF BEING DRAWN UNWILLINGLY INTO SOME RASH IRAQ-INSPIRED ADVENTURE.
3. KING HAS STILL NOT TALKED TO DELEGATION HE SENT TO SEE SADAT. WILL DO THAT AND THEN SEND DELEGATION TO DAMASCUS. HE HIMSELF PLANS TO GO TO SYRIA TOMORROW TO CELEBRATE END OF RAMADAN FEAST WITH HIS FORCES IN THE FIELD.

BROWN

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#5691

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Department of State

COPY 9 OF 15 COPIES

W H WAR
TELEGRAM

O 251027Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0270
BT
SECRET TEL AVIV 8591

CONTROL: 7160Q
RECVD: 25 OCT 73
6:49AM

NODIS

E O 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFCR, PINR, MCPS, IS, US, XF.
SUBJECT: VIOLATION OF CEASEFIRE IN SOUTH

REF: (A) TEL AVIV 8575, (B), DAO MSG 1950 241620Z OCT 73.
(C) DAO MSG 1959 250905Z OCT 73.

I DRAW YOUR ATTENTION TO REF (C) CONCERNING IDF INTERCEPT
AT 1100 LOCAL OF EGYPTIAN THIRD ARMY HEADQUARTERS REQUESTING
AIR STRIKES FOR 1330 LOCAL OCT 24. I BELIEVE THIS
ADDITIONAL PIECE OF INTELLIGENCE SHOULD HELP
CONVINCE EVEN MOST SKEPTICAL THAT EGYPTIANS
RESPONSIBLE FOR INITIATING MASSIVE VIOLATIONS OF CEASEFIRE IN
SOUTHERN SECTOR OF SUEZ FRONT YESTERDAY.

KEATING

BT
#8591

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NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

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SECRET/EXDIS

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Operations Center

MIDDLE EAST TASK FORCE
Situation Report # 62

Situation Report in the Middle East as of 0600 EDT, 10/25/73

Cease-Fire

The second cease-fire appears to be holding. October 24-25 was a quiet night on the Syrian and Egyptian fronts. Al-Ahram reported that two small groups of UNTSO cease-fire observers had taken up positions in Port Said and Ismailia. Earlier on October 24 Israeli Deputy Prime Minister Allon told our Ambassador that Israel could have completely destroyed the Egyptian army if given 3-5 days more, but that the GOI meant it when it told the President and the Secretary that Israel accepted the cease-fire.

United Nations

In the emergency Security Council session late October 24 called by Egypt, Kenya introduced a draft resolution on behalf of the non-aligned countries calling for an increase in the number of UN observers and the immediate creation of a United Nations Emergency Force. Egypt claimed grave Israeli violations of the cease-fire, while Israel insisted that after early fighting on October 24, precipitated by an Egyptian effort to break out of Israeli military encirclement, the cease-fire had taken hold. The meeting adjourned about midnight October 24 with agreement to reconvene at 10:30 a.m. EDT October 25 to consider Kenya's proposal.

Resupply

Reuter reported late October 24 that our Charge in Bonn had been summoned to the West German Foreign Ministry "in connection with the loading of Israeli ships with American military equipment" and told of Germany's intention to maintain its "neutral position" in the Middle East

SECRET/EXDIS
GDS - DECLASS Dec. 31, 1981

SECRET/EXDIS

2.

conflict. Our Charge' has been instructed to register our extreme concern at the latest turn in FRG attitudes towards resupply of Israel. The PLO has publicly called on Arab states to cut off oil to West Germany because of the FRG's permitting U.S. resupply of Israel from West Germany.

E & E

Cairo has agreed to letting our charter for a Greek ship expire at noon October 25. Embassy Athens will maintain up to the minute information on vessels in the area available on short notice for evacuation.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE OPERATIONS CENTER
APPROVED BY: <i>Roderick M. Wright</i>
DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS

SECRET/EXDIS

SECRET (GDS)

October 25, 1973

CONTINGENCY PAPER

DIPLOMATIC SCENARIO

Introduction of US Force in Connection with Enforcing Ceasefire

Assumption: The Soviets are moving their own military forces into the Cairo area "to police the ceasefire." It has been impossible to pass a UN Security Council Resolution calling for a UN force limited to the non-permanent members of the Security Council and other UN members.

The issue is to design a diplomatic scenario for the parallel introduction of US forces.

The US objectives are:

1. To prevent such a Soviet move from fundamentally altering the balance of power in the Middle East through the stationing of major Soviet combat forces there on a long-term basis.
2. To show our friends and allies that the US has the resolve to oppose a unilateral Soviet move of this significance.
3. To put ourselves in a position where the removal of Soviet forces can be negotiated in parallel to the withdrawal of US forces when a UN force without permanent Security Council members can be assembled.
4. To help stabilize the ceasefire.

SECRET (GDS)

SECRET (GDS)

- 2 -

The US purpose should be to introduce forces in such a way that the US does not appear to be moving in support of Israeli military gains since the first ceasefire. This would best be accomplished by clear statements of US intentions and by the actions of US troops once in place. It seems unlikely that any Arab country would welcome US forces as part of such an operation, even though this might help demonstrate that we are not moving primarily to support Israel. Of the Arab countries, only Jordan might be inclined to accept US forces.

The possibility of introducing US forces into Lebanon and Saudi Arabia as well as into Jordan has been considered. The possible advantage might be symbolically to demonstrate that we were not moving primarily in support of Israel. In their current mood, however, most Arab leaders would be likely to oppose strongly the presence of US forces in their country. In addition, a US military presence in Lebanon would put us in the middle of a very tense Lebanese situation which could erupt into civil war. On balance, this is not recommended.

King Faisal is unlikely to welcome the presence of US troops, and this could have overtones of moving to seize oil fields in the area. On balance, the Saudis would almost certainly refuse a US request to send troops.

SECRET (GDS)

SECRET (GDS)

- 3 -

Diplomatic Scenario

Diplomatically, six sets of action are required:

Phase I - First, an approach to those countries to which we would propose staging the US force, explaining our purposes and objectives and seeking their concurrence. At a minimum, these would be Israel and perhaps Jordan. Simultaneously, we should inform Lebanon and Saudi Arabia of our proposal and seeking their understanding of our moves. We would also ask the Saudis, Jordanians and Lebanese to weigh in with Sadat to elicit his understanding of our actions.

Phase II (following receipt of agreement from governments concerned for stationing troops on their territory) - Second, an approach to the Soviets and Egyptians advising them of what we are doing and why.

Third, an approach to NATO making clear we expect a firm showing of allied solidarity.

Fourth, an approach to special friends who have a particular interest in and concern about the Arab-Israel conflict and its implications for their interests. This should include at a minimum the Shah of Iran and Prime Minister Bhutto of Pakistan.

Fifth, a general approach worldwide to all governments not recipients of one of the special messages outlined above.

Sixth, instructions to Ambassador Scali on what posture to take in the Security Council, including the text of a statement he would make in the Council.

SECRET (GDS)

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- 4 -

Implementing instructions for the foregoing scenario are attached.

In addition, it will be necessary to make high level approaches to those governments from whom overflight and other support facilities en route are required according to the military plan adopted.

SECRET (GDS)

QUANDT

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CIA _____	DIA/G _____	'73 OCT 25 PM 2:56	
STATE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> _____	DIA/H _____		
NMCC _____	DASA _____		
ANMCC _____	NPIC _____		
NSA _____			
NUMBER OF PAGES 4		DESCRIPTION/COMMENT:	
FROM: WILLIAM QUANDT		SECRET (GDS)	
TO: DAVID KORN		DEPT OF STATE OCT 25 1973	
ME. TASK FORCE			
RECEIVED BY: DEW	DATE/TIME:		



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET 972

PAGE 01 STATE 210444

13
ORIGIN SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 PCH-04 SSO-00 NSCE-00 /035 R

DRAFTED BY NEA:DMRANSOM:HS
APPROVED BY NEA:DMRANSOM
S/S-01 RMWRIGHT

072466

O 250811Z OCT 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SUVA BY POUCH
AMEMBASSY BANJUL BY POUCH
AMCONSUL CURACAO BY POUCH
AMCONSUL MARTINIQUE BY POUCH
XMT AMEMBASSY SUVA
AMEMBASSY BANJUL

SECRET STATE 210444

EXDIS

KUWAIT POUCH MUSCAT DHOHA

BEIRUT POUCH BAGHDAD
BRASILIA POUCH RECIFE

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: XF
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

1. FOLLOWING IS ME SITUATION THROUGH EVENING OF OCT. 24.
2. MILITARY SITUATION. CEASEFIRE WHICH WENT INTO EFFECT AT 0700 BATTLEFIELD TIME 24 OCT. (0100 EDT) WAS APPARENTLY VIOLATED ON EGYPTIAN FRONT AT ABOUT 1400 LOCAL (0800 EDT) WHEN, ISRAELIS SAY, EGYPTIAN THIRD ARMY BEGAN ATTEMPT BREAK OUT OF ITS POSITION EAST OF THE CANAL TOWARD THE MITLA PASS. SIMULTANEOUSLY EGYPTIAN THIRD ARMY UNITS WEST

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

SECRET

ANDERSON _____
HOLDRIDGE _____
HORMATS _____
JORDEN _____
KERNES _____
LEHMAN _____
LEVINE _____
NEGROPONTE _____
ODEH _____
PATLICK _____
RONDON _____
SHEPHERD _____
V. I. G. _____
WALSH _____

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5



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 210444

OF THE CANAL, NEAR SUEZ CITY, WERE ALSO IN ACTION, AND WHAT THE IDF TERMED MASSIVE EGYPTIAN AIR ACTIVITY SUPPORTED OPERATIONS ON BOTH BANKS. BY END OF 24 OCT., HOWEVER, FIGHTING ON SOUTHERN PART OF SUEZ FRONT SEEMED TO HAVE TAPERED OFF WITH LITTLE CHANGE IN DISPOSITIONS OF FORCES DURING DAY. IDF FORCES WERE STILL AT ADABIYA, SOUTH OF SUEZ CITY, CUTTING OFF THE CITY AND THIRD ARMY FORCES ON THE EAST BANK. -THE NORTHERN PART OF THE SUEZ FRONT, CONTAINING ELEMENTS OF THE SECOND ARMY, REMAINED QUIET ON 24 OCT. FOLLOWING SYRIAN GOVT ACCEPTANCE OF THE CEASEFIRE, THE GOLAN FRONT WAS ALSO QUIET ON 24 OCT.

3. CEASEFIRE. AS EGYPT HAD DONE EARLIER, SYRIA ANNOUNCED IT ACCEPTED CEASEFIRE ON CONDITION THAT IT WOULD MEAN (1) COMPLETE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM ALL ARAB TERRITORY

OCCUPIED SINCE 1967 AND AFTER; (2) SAFEGUARDING THE LEGITIMATE NATIONAL RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE UN RESOLUTION, AND (3) ISRAEL ACCEPTED AND APPLIED THE CEASEFIRE RESOLUTION. EGYPT CALLED ANOTHER MEETING OF SECURITY COUNCIL ON EVENING 24 OCT. TO CONSIDER CHARGES OF ISRAELI VIOLATIONS OF CEASEFIRE. EGYPT SAID IT WOULD ALSO REQUEST COUNCIL TO CALL ON US AND USSR TO SEND FORCES OF THEIR OWN TO SUPERVISE AND INSURE CEASEFIRE. A WASHINGTON SPOKESMAN SAID USG DID NOT INTEND TO SEND ITS FORCES TO MIDEAST FOR THIS PURPOSE. UNTSO OBSERVERS LEFT CAIRO TO SET UP NEW OBSERVATION POSTS APPROVED BY ISRAELIS ON THE WEST BANK OF THE CANAL, BUT NO MOVES WERE REPORTED TO SET UP POSTS ON EAST BANK OF CANAL. SOME UNTSO POSTS CONTINUE TO FUNCTION IN GOLAN BUT THESE WILL HAVE TO BE MOVED AND MULTIPLIED TO COVER THE NEW CEASEFIRE LINE. ACCORDING TO OUR REPORTS, POPULAR REACTION TO CEASEFIRE WAS COOL BOTH IN ARAB COUNTRIES AND ISRAEL. IN SYRIA, WESTERN AMBASSADOR DESCRIBED PRESIDENT ASAD AS QUOTE IN TROUBLE WITH THE RADICALS UNQUOTE FOLLOWING SYRIA'S ACCEPTANCE OF CEASEFIRE. LEFTIST SYRIAN ELEMENTS, SUPPORTED BY FEDAYEEN AND LARGE IRAQI FORCES, SOUGHT CONTINUATION OF FIGHTING, AND PERHAPS ASAD'S OUSTER. SADAT'S POSITION IS ALSO REPORTED UNDER PRESSURE AS RESULT OF WIDESPREAD EGYPTIAN FEELING THAT ARABS COULD AND SHOULD CONTINUE THE FIGHT.



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4. MILITARY RESUPPLY. IN WASHINGTON THE DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN ANNOUNCED USG WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS WITH THE SOVIET UNION A REDUCTION OF EMERGENCY RESUPPLY EFFORT.

5. PRISONERS. USG CONTINUED ITS EFFORTS THROUGH ICRC TO SECURE EARLY AND COMPLETE EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS.

6. POLITICAL. IN WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN SAID THAT THERE IS NO QUOTE PRESCRIBED FORUM OR PRESCRIBED FORMULA UNQUOTE FOR NEGOTIATING PROCESS WHICH IS INTENDED TO FOLLOW CEASEFIRE.

7. OIL. EMBASSY JIDDA POINTS OUT THAT DESPITE NEARLY 25 PERCENT CUTBACK IN SAUDI OIL EXPORTS, RECENTLY DECREED RISES IN GULF OIL POSTED PRICES MEAN THAT SAUDIS WILL ACTUALLY INCREASE NET CURRENT INCOME BY DOLLARS 4-5 MILLION PER DAY. AMERICAN OIL COMPANY OFFICIALS REPORT THAT ONLY BY FOLLOW-THROUGH AND IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 242 WILL THE SAUDIS BE PERSUADED TO LIFT THEIR PRODUCTION CUTBACKS AND EXPORT EMBARGO; IF THESE MEASURES DO NOT SUCCEED IN PRODUCING RESULTS, SAUDIS MAY GO FURTHER, INCLUDING NATIONALIZATION OF AMERICAN OIL INTERESTS IN KINGDOM. SAUDI OIL MINISTER YAMANI HAS TOLD

JAPANESE THAT THEY CAN ESCAPE A 14-15 PERCENT CUT IN SAUDI OIL SHIPMENTS TO JAPAN ONLY BY CUTTING DIPLOMATIC OR ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL, SELLING ARMS TO ARAB STATES, OR BY LOBBYING INTENSIVELY WITH US ON BEHALF OF A SETTLEMENT OF THE MIDEAST CONFLICT QUOTE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE UN RESOLUTIONS. UNQUOTE. KUWAIT AND QATAR HAVE FOLLOWED EXAMPLE OF ALGERIA AND IRAQ IN EMBARGOING OIL SHIPMENTS TO NETHERLANDS -- ESTIMATED AT 11 PERCENT OF TOTAL KUWAIT PRODUCTION. MEANWHILE, KUWAIT OIL WORKERS' THREE-DAY STRIKE AGAINST ANGLO-AMERICAN KUWAIT OIL COMPANY AND AMERICAN INDEPENDENT OIL COMPANY IS IN ITS SECOND DAY WITH ALL REFINING OPERATIONS AT A STANDSTILL. GOVT OF BAHRAIN HAS HALTED DELIVERIES BY CALTEX TO MSC TANKERS FOR US FORCES IN FAR EAST. UNITED ARAB EMIRATE PRESIDENT SHAIKH ZAYID HAS WARNED THAT IN ADDITION TO THE OIL EXPORT EMBARGO THE UAE MAY TAKE FURTHER STEPS AGAINST

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SECRET



Department of State **TELEGRAM**

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US ECONOMIC INTEREST.

B. LA SALLE INCIDENT. THE LA SALLE, A US MERCHANT SHIP RETURNING FROM RED SEA PORTS (INCLUDING JIDDA, WHERE CARGO FOR JORDAN WAS OFF-LOADED), WAS HALTED BY UNIDENTIFIED WARSHIP FIRING ACROSS LA SALLE'S BOW. DEPARTURE OF ADAMS, A COMIDEASTFOR DESTROYER, FROM DJIBOUTI TO ESCORT LA SALLE WAS STOPPED BY THE FRENCH PORT COMMANDER, WHO CITED NEED TO MAINTAIN NEUTRALITY THEIR TERRITORY. THE US NAVY IS PROTESTING THIS ORDER TO FRENCH PORT COMMANDER. THE LA SALLE IS NOW STEAMING FOR DJIBOUTI, REPORTEDLY WITHOUT DAMAGE OR CASUALTIES. THE ADAMS, WHEN IT SAILS, IS UNDER ORDERS TO CONVOY OTHER US MERCHANT SHIPS NOW NEAR DJIBOUTI INTO THE RED SEA. KISSINGER

NOTE BY OC/T: POUCHED ABOVE ADDRESSEE.

NIXON PRESIDENTIAL MATERIALS PROJECT
DOCUMENT CONTROL RECORD

ITEM REMOVED FROM THIS FILE FOLDER

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A sanitized copy substituted for an original item which contains information restricted under the Privacy Act.

*****U N C L A S S I F I E D***** COPY

WAR
25 Oct

FLASH
DE RUEHC #0714 2981939
Z 251921Z OCT 73 ZFF4
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS FLASH
AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 2734

UNCLAS STATE 210714

BEIRUT PASS BAGHDAD
INFORM CONSULS
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S PRESS CONFERENCE

1. THE FOLLOWING IS SUMMARY OF POINTS MADE BY THE
SECRETARY AT HIS OCTOBER 25 PRESS CONFERENCE:

2. SINCE OCTOBER 22ND, THERE HAVE BEEN A NUMBER OF
CHARGES AND COUNTER-CHARGES OF CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS. A
PROPOSAL WAS MADE FOR A JOINT US-SOVIET FORCE TO ENFORCE
THE CEASE-FIRE.

3. THE US DOES NOT FAVOR AND WILL NOT APPROVE A JOINT
US-SOVIET FORCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST. WHAT IS NEEDED, IS A
DETERMINATION OF THE FACTS--WHERE THE BELLIGERENT FORCES
ARE LOCATED AND WHO IS VIOLATING THE CEASE-FIRE--SO THAT
THE SECURITY COUNCIL CAN TAKE THE APPROPRIATE ACTION. WE
ARE OPPOSED TO A JOINT US-SOVIET FORCE SINCE THIS WOULD
INTRODUCE GREAT POWER RIVALRIES INTO THE MIDDLE EAST, AND
ARE ALSO OPPOSED TO THE IMPOSITION OF A MILITARY
"CONDOMINIUM" BY THE GREAT POWERS.

4. THE US IS EVEN MORE OPPOSED TO THE UNILATERAL INTRO-
DUCTION OF MILITARY FORCE BY A NUCLEAR POWER UNDER WHAT-
EVER GUISE. RECENT SOVIET MILITARY ACTIONS ARE AMBIGUOUS
AND THUS THE PRESIDENT ORDERED A PRECAUTIONARY ALERT OF
US FORCES AT 0300, EDT. WE DO NOT CONSIDER OURSELVES IN
CONFRONTATION WITH THE USSR AND DO NOT BELIEVE IT NECES-
SARY AT THIS MOMENT TO HAVE CONFRONTATION.

5. THE SECRETARY OUTLINED THE US POSITION:

***** W H S R COMMENT *****

JANKA

PSN:018259 PAGE 01 TOR:298/20:00Z DTG:251921Z OCT 73

*****U N C L A S S I F I E D***** COPY

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(A) THE US STANDS FOR STRICT OBSERVANCE OF UNSC
RESOLUTION 338 OF OCTOBER 22;

(B) THE US WILL SUPPORT AND GIVE ASSISTANCE (IN-
CLUDING A LIMITED NUMBER OF PERSONNEL) TO A TRUCE
OBSERVER FORCE WHICH REPORTS TO THE SECURITY
COUNCIL;

(C) THE US IS PREPARED TO AGREE TO AN INTERNATIONAL
PEACE-KEEPING FORCE AS LONG AS NO PERMANENT MEMBER
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL IS A MEMBER OF IT;

(D) THE US IS PREPARED TO MAKE A MAJOR EFFORT AND
LEND ITS DIPLOMATIC WEIGHT TO THE SEARCH FOR A
POLITICAL SOLUTION, RECOGNIZING THAT THE CIRCUM-
STANCES WHICH PRODUCED THE OCTOBER HOSTILITIES
MUST BE CHANGED. KISSINGER

BT

PSN:018259 PAGE 02 OF 02 TOR:298/20:00Z DTG:251921Z OCT 73

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*****C O N F I D E N T I A L***** COPY

Wo
25 Oct

ROUTINE
ESA919REA433
DE RUEBSE #2450 2981050
R 251012Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 4900

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN 8393
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 5884
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 4261
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 4572
DIA WASHDC
USMISSION USUN 2492
CINCEUR
ZEN/USINT BAGHDAD

C O N F I D E N T I A L BEIRUT 12450

DEPT PASS CAIRO
E.O. 11652: NGDS
TAGS: PINS SY

SUBJECT: SYRIAN INTERNAL SITUATION

REF: AMMAN 5665 AND 5675

INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO US ON SYRIAN SITUATION FROM SEVERAL DIFFERENT RELIABLE SOURCES CONFIRMS VIEW REPORTED AMMAN REFTELS. ALTHOUGH SYRIAN ARMY BADLY HURT, MORALE NEVER BROKE NOR DID DETERMINATION TO FIGHT LAG. SOME MAJOR UNITS OF ARMY IN PROCESS REORGANIZING AND REEQUIPPING WHEN CEASE-FIRE ACCEPTED. GENERAL FEELING AMONG ARMY, INCLUDING WOUNDED OFFICERS WHO HOSPITALIZED BEIRUT BUT RETURNED TO UNITS ON HEARING OF CEASE-FIRE, IS THAT SARG SHOULD NOT HAVE ACCEPTED IT. MORALE OF CIVILIAN POPULATION ALSO HIGH, WITH DETERMINATION WAGE "POPULAR WAR" DESPITE HEAVY DAMAGE TO ECONOMIC SECTOR. ON OTHER HAND, SYRIAN PARTICIPATION IN WAR AND RELATIVE SUCCESS OF ITS ARMY GREATLY INCREASED STRENGTH OF PRESIDENT ASSAD AND AT LEAST TEMPORARILY EFFACED USUAL SYRIAN SECTARIAN AND POLITICAL DISSENSION. IT WAS THIS STRENGTH PLUS SUPPORT OF USSR, EGYPT AND SAUDI ARABIA (BY MEANS OF POL EMBARGO ON US) WHICH ENABLED ASSAD PUSH THROUGH HIS DECISION ACCEPT CEASE-FIRE. HIS ABILITY HOLD OUT FOR LONG IF THERE NO VISIBLE POLITICAL GAINS FROM SUCH DECISION IS CONSIDERED, AS NOTED REFTEL, "DICEY". HOSTILE PRESSURES

PSN:018009

PAGE 01

TDR:298/15:33Z

DTG:251012Z OCT 73

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COMING FROM IRAQIS, IRAQI-LINING MEMBERS OF SYRIAN BAAATH,
AND FEDAYEEN. RUFFUM
BT

PSN:018009 PAGE 02 OF 02 TOR:298/15:33Z DTG:251012Z OCT 73

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LON167
OL RUFHBL #5489 2001742
O 251719Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY BONN

WAR
OCT 25

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE #303

INFO SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS BONN 15488

E.O. 11652:N/A

TAGS: MILI, GW

SUBJECT: FONOFF PRESS ANNOUNCEMENT ON SHIPMENTS OF
US MILITARY MATERIAL TO ISRAEL

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF A FONOFF PRESS RELEASE
MADE PUBLIC AFTERNOON OCT 25. QUOTE: ON OCT 24 THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT LEARNED THAT ISRAELI VESSELS WERE
LOADED IN BREITENHAVEN WITH US MATERIAL DESTINED FOR
ISRAEL AND DEPARTED FROM THE PORT. IMMEDIATELY AFTER
THIS, THE FONOFF STATE SECRETARY REQUESTED THE US
CHARGE D'AFFAIRES (SIC) IN BONN TO CALL ON HIM. WITH
REFERENCE TO THE DEMARCHE TO THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR
OF THE PREVIOUS DAY, HE STATED THE STRICT NEUTRA-
LITY OF THE FRG WITH RESPECT TO THE NEAR EAST CONFLICT
MAKES IT MANDATORY THAT DELIVERIES OF WEAPONS FROM US
STOCKS IN THE FRG TO ONE OF THE PARTIES IN THE ARMED
CONFLICT BY MEANS OF THE TERRITORY OF INSTALLATIONS
BELONGING TO THE FRG. THE US CHARGE D'AFFAIRES WAS
FURTHER AD-vised THAT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS CON-
FIDENT THAT THUS THE AMERICAN DELIVERIES FROM AND VIA
THE FRG ARE BEING DEFINITELY ENDED. THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT IS FIRMLY DETERMINED NOT TO ALLOW ITSELF TO BE
INVOLVED IN THE NEAR EAST CONFLICT. DESPITE THE BURDEN
CAUSED BY THE NEAR NEAR EAST CONFLICT THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
IS ADHERING TO NEUTRALITY AND THE BALANCE OF ITS NEAR EAST
POLICY. IT IS CONVINCED THAT BY THIS ATTITUDE IT MAY
BEST SERVE TO BRING ABOUT A PERMANENT AND JUST PEACE.
END QUOTE.

Bonn reply
mad

2. WE PLAN TO ANSWER NO COMMENT IF QUERIED ABOUT THE
ANNOUNCEMENT. HILLENBRAND

***** W I S H C O M M E N T *****

LL, SONNENFELD, SAUNDERS


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PAGE 01

TOR:298/18:33Z

DTG:251719Z OCT 73

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*****C O N F I D E N T I A L***** COPY

OP IMMED /PRIORITY
DTB854
DE RUEHDT #4188 2240755
U P 250710Z OCT 73
FM USMISSION USUN NY

Wor
25 Oct

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0479

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 3672
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 4484
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 4270
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 4655
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 9281
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 9185
USINT CAIRO PRIORITY 3525
AMCONGEN JERUSALEM PRIORITY 2102
USLO PEKING PRIORITY 0103
AMCONGEN HONG KONG PRIORITY 1025

C O N F I D E N T I A L

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE USUN 4188
E.O. 11652: DECLASSIFY OCTOBER 25, 1974
TAGS: PFOR, UN, XF
SUBJ: SC MEETING ON MIDDLE EAST, OCTOBER 24-25

1. SECURITY COUNCIL MET FOR SIX HOURS NIGHT OF OCTOBER 24-25
AT EGYPT'S REQUEST TO CONSIDER CONTINUING VIOLATIONS OF
CEASE-FIRE. AT CLOSE OF MEETING, NON-ALIGNED TABLED
DRAFT RES (SEPTOL) ASKING SYG TO INCREASE NUMBER OF UN OBSERVERS
AND DECIDING "TO SET UP IMMEDIATELY A UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY
FORCE UNDER (SC) AUTHORITY." COUNCIL WILL MEET 10:30 A.M.
OCTOBER 25 TO CONSIDER FURTHER AND VOTE ON DRAFT.

2. EGYPT CLAIMED ISRAELI VIOLATIONS WERE SO GRAVE AS TO
CONSTITUTE "A NEW WAR," NOT SIMPLY BREAKDOWN OF CEASE-FIRE.
ON OTHER HAND, ISRAEL INSISTED THAT AFTER EARLY FIGHTING ON
OCTOBER 24, PRECIPITATED BY EGYPTIAN EFFORT TO BREAK OUT
OF ISRAELI MILITARY ENCIRCLEMENT, CEASE-FIRE HAD
TAKEN HOLD.

3. THROUGHOUT EVENING, DEBATE FOCUSED ON EGYPTIAN
DEMAND THAT US AND USSR FACE UP TO THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES
AS CO-SPONSORS OF EARLIER CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTION AND

* * * * * W H S R C O M M E N T * * * * *

SCOWCROFT, QUANT, HORAN, LL

PSN:017676 PAGE 01 TOK:298/08:097 DTG:250710Z OCT 73

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ENSURE COMPLIANCE. EGYPT REQUESTED TWO POWERS TO INTERVENE USING FORCES IN MEDITERRANEAN TO BRING PARTIES BACK TO WHERE THEY WERE WHEN CEASE-FIRE TOOK EFFECT. NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS GENERALLY TOOK TACK THAT US AND USSR HAD SPECIAL RESPONSIBILITY TO SEE THEIR RESOLUTION IMPLEMENTED, WHILE AVOIDING QUESTION OF USING US AND SOVIET FORCES. SOVIETS (MALIK) ALSO JUCKED ISSUE, INSISTING ONLY THAT US HAD RESPONSIBILITY TO FORCE ISRAEL TO COMPLY WITH CEASE-FIRE. USSR ALSO SAID TIME HAD COME FOR ADOPTION OF APPROPRIATE STRICT SANCTIONS AGAINST ISRAEL, ATTACKED UN FOR SLOPPINESS IN GETTING OBSERVERS TO CEASE-FIRE LINES, AND CRITICIZED COMPOSITION OF UNTSO AS UNBALANCED. MALIK ASKED THAT ALL STATES BREAK RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL.

4. TEXT OF AMB. SCALISI'S STATEMENT BEING SENT SIPTEL.
SCALISI
BT

PSN:017676 PAGE 02 OF 02 TUR:298/05:09Z DTG:250710Z OCT 72

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*****C O N F I D E N T I A L***** COPY

War
25 Oct
Oil-Libya

ROUTINE
ESA874TIA608
DE RUESTI #1365 2901000
R 250936Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 0672

INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 1697
AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0743
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT 0427
AMEMBASSY LONDON 2107
AMEMBASSY PARIS 1509
AMEMBASSY ROME 1165
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN 0335
AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 0219

C O N F I D E N T I A L TRIPOLI 1365

LIMDIS
F.O. 11652: CDS
TAGS: ENRG, LY
SUBJ: LIBYAN APPLICATION ^{OF} ~~FOR~~ PRODUCTION CUTS
AND AMERICAN EMBARGO

1. LIBYAN APPLICATION OF PRODUCTION CUT HAS HAD UNEVEN EFFECT ON COMPANIES. CUTS ARE FIVE PERCENT "ON BASIS OF SEPTEMBER PRODUCTION." AT AMOSEAS, LIBYAN MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE DECIDED TO SUBTRACT FIVE PERCENT OF SEPTEMBER PRODUCTION FROM PEAK OCTOBER PRODUCTION. AT OCCIDENTAL, LIBYANS REQUIRING REDUCTION TO SEPTEMBER AVERAGE AND, THEN, A FURTHER FIVE PERCENT CUT. FOR AMOSEAS, WHOSE OCTOBER PRODUCTION WAS 237,000 B/D AT CUT TIME, AND WHOSE SEPTEMBER PRODUCTION AVERAGED 174,000 B/D CUT IS LESS THAN FIVE PERCENT. FOR OCCIDENTAL, WHOSE SEPTEMBER PRODUCTION AVERAGED 439,000 B/D AND PEAKED AT 475,000, AND WHOSE OCTOBER PRODUCTION WAS ABOUT 451,000 B/D, CUT IS SUBSTANTIALLY MORE THAN FIVE H34:3,5.

2. ENFORCEMENT OF AMERICAN EMBARGO HAS EQUALLY UNEVEN EFFECT ON COMPANIES. LIBYAN INTERPRETATION OF

***** WISR COMMENT *****

SAUNDERS,CIEP

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EMBARGO IS THAT IT PREVENTS ONLY CONJUNCT REFINARIES DIRECTLY TO U.S. PORTS. THIS IS SERIOUS PROBLEM FOR OCCIDENTAL, WHICH HAS JUST CONCLUDED CONTRACT FOR SUBSTANTIAL PROPANE/BUTANE DELIVERIES DIRECTLY TO U.S. PORTS. MINISTRY OF PETROLEUM SAYS IT "RELUCTANTLY" PREVENTING THESE SHIPMENTS. AMOSEAS, ON THE OTHER HAND, SHIPS APPROXIMATELY 65 PERCENT OF ITS PRODUCTION TO REFINERIES IN SARDINA, THE BAHAMAS AND TRINIDAD. THEN PRODUCTS ARE IMMEDIATELY TRANSSHIPPED TO THE U.S. LIBYANS AWARE THAT ULTIMATE BENEFICIARY OF AMOSEAS' CRUDE IS U.S., BUT RAISING NO OBJECTIONS TO SHIPMENT OF ANY CRUDE NOT DOCUMENTED AS DESTINED DIRECTLY FOR U.S. PORT.

3. MAJOR AND APPARENTLY CYNICAL EXCEPTION FROM U.S. EMBARGO IS LIBYAN NATIONAL OIL COMPANY. NOC CONTINUES LOADING CARGOES (PARTICULARLY HOT OIL SHIPMENTS) ON U.S. COMPANY SHIPS AND CARES NOT WHERE THE OIL GOES. INDUSTRY SOURCES SAY THAT NOC CLAIMS THEY ALREADY HAVE AMERICAN BUYERS FOR SUBSTANTIAL AMOUNTS OF NOC OIL WITH NEW \$8.92 POSTED PRICE AS SALE PRICE. NOC NOT REPEAT NOT TURNING AWAY ANY AMERICAN BUYER WILLING TO PAY THOSE KINDS OF PRICES.

4. IT TOO EARLY TO MAKE FIRM JUDGMENT. HOWEVER, IT APPEARS THAT LIBYANS MUCH MORE FLEXIBLE IN THEIR APPROACH TO PRODUCTION CUTS AND EMBARGOES THAN ARE THEIR ARAB COUSINS IN THE GULF, PARTICULARLY SAUDI ARABIA. NOC'S APPARENT EXEMPTION FROM EMBARGO MIGHT EVEN BE CONSTRUED AS CYNICAL DISREGARD FOR PAN-ARAB POSITIONS.

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TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK - FLASH 4069

S E C R E T STATE 210472

EXDIS

SUBJECT: SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION, MIDDLE EAST

1. YOU SHOULD APPROACH NON-ALIGNED MEMBERS OF SECURITY COUNCIL AT ONCE AND OTHERS AS APPROPRIATE AND NEGOTIATE FOLLOWING CHANGES IN EIGHT-POWER RESOLUTION.

2. FIRST PARAGRAPH SHOULD READ: "DEMANDS THAT IMMEDIATE AND COMPLETE CEASE-FIRE BE OBSERVED AND THAT THE PARTIES RETURN TO THE POSITIONS OCCUPIED BY THEM AT SEVENTEEN FIFTY GMT ON OCTOBER 22, 1973."

3. THIRD PARAGRAPH SHOULD READ: "DECIDES TO SET UP IMMEDIATELY, UNDER ITS AUTHORITY, A UN EMERGENCY FORCE, TO BE COMPOSED OF PERSONNEL DRAWN FROM STATES MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS EXCEPT PERMANENT MEMBERS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL, AND REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT WITHIN 24 HOURS ON STEPS TAKEN TO THIS EFFECT."

4. IF THIS RESOLUTION IS ADOPTED, YOU SHOULD ADVISE SYG THAT IN OUR JUDGMENT HE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY TRANSFER 750-1000 PERSONNEL FROM UNFICYP CYPRUS, REPLENISHING THESE FORCES FROM CONTRIBUTIONS TO NEW UNEF. HE SHOULD SEEK INFORMAL SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVAL FOR THIS STEP. KISSINGER
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SONNENFELD, HORAN, QUANDT

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ESA228TAB785
DE RULSL5 #8614 2901403
O 251350Z OCT 73
FM AMEMBASSY LAGOS

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1558

INFO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE 072
AMEMBASSY ACCRA 4887
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA 2146
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1822
AMCONSUL KADUNA 8090
ZEN/AMCONSUL IADAN 4957

CONFIDENTIAL

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LAGOS 8614
P.O. 11652: M/A
TAGS: PFOR, NI, XF
SUBJECT: NIGERIA BREAKS RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL
REF: LAGOS 8601
FMG ANNOUNCED AT 1300 HOURS LOCAL TIME THAT IT HAS BROKEN
RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL. REASON FOR BREAK WAS ADVANCE BY ISRAELI
TROOPS BEYOND 1967 CEASEFIRE LINES ON WEST BANK. ISRAELI
AMBASSADOR INFORMED OF RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS ONE
HOUR BEFORE PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT. FULL DETAILS FOLLOW SEPTTEL.
BEINHARDT
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*****WHHR COMMENT*****

QUANDT, HORAN, WHHR

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OP IMMED PRIORITY
DTA 775
DE RUEHDT 0418Z 29 0705
O P 250622Z OCT 73
FM USMISSION USUN 4173

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0474

INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 3670
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY 4484
AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 4268
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 4651
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 9272
AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 8181
USINT CAIRO PRIORITY 3523
AMCUNGEN JERUSALEM PRIORITY 2100
USLO BEIRUT 0100
AMCUNGEN HONG KONG 1822

UNCLAS USUN 4173

E.O. 11652: 4/7

TAGS: PFOR, UN, XF

SUBJ: NON-ALIGNED DRAFT RESOLUTION ON ME

REF: USUN 4177 (NOTAL)

FOLLOWING IS TEXT OF DRAFT RESOLUTION TABLED BY NON-ALIGNED
AT CONCLUSION OF SC MEETING EARLY MORNING OCTOBER 25.
SPONSORS WERE INDIA, INDONESIA, GUINEA, YUGOSLAVIA, SOVIET,
PERU, PANAMA, AND KENYA.

"THE SECURITY COUNCIL

"RECALLING ITS RESOLUTIONS 338 OF 21ST OCTOBER 1973
AND 339 OF 23RD OCTOBER 1973,

"NOTING WITH REGRET THE REPORTED REPEATED VIOLATIONS OF
THE CEASEFIRE IN NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE RESOLUTIONS 338 AND
339,

"NOTING WITH CONCERN FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL'S
REPORT THAT THE UNITED NATIONS OBSERVERS HAVE NOT YET
BEEN ABLE TO PLACE THEMSELVES ON BOTH SIDES OF THE
CEASEFIRE LINE,

"(1) DEMANDS THAT IMMEDIATE AND COMPLETE CEASEFIRE
BE OBSERVED AND THAT THE PARTIES WITHDRAW TO THE POSI-
TIONS OCCUPIED BY THEM AT 5,50 GMT ON 22ND OCTOBER 1973,

"(2) REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, AS AN IMMEDIATE
STEP, TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF UN OBSERVERS ON BOTH

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SCOWCROFT, QUANOT, HORAN, LL

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SIDES,

"(3) DECIDES TO SET UP IMMEDIATELY A UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE UNDER ITS AUTHORITY, AND REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT WITHIN 24 HOURS ON THE STEPS TAKEN TO THIS EFFECT,

"(4) REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO REPORT TO THE COUNCIL ON AN URGENT AND CONTINUING BASIS OF THE STATE OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION AS WELL AS RESOLUTIONS 338 AND 339.

"(5) REQUESTS ALL MEMBER STATES TO EXTEND THEIR FULL COOPERATION IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THIS RESOLUTION AS WELL AS RESOLUTIONS 338 AND 339."

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0472

C O N F I D E N T I A L USUN 4101

F.D. 11652: GDS
TAGS: XF UNSC -FER
SUBJ: SC MIDDLE EAST RESOLUTION

1. THIS TELEGRAM DEALS ONLY WITH OP PARA 3 OF RAFT 17-
ALIGNED RES TABLED SC MORNING OCT 25.

2. AT FIRST GLANCE THIS PARA RAISES FOLLOWING SET OF QUESTIONS:
A) IT ESTABLISHES UN EMERGENCY FORCE BUT DOES NOT PROVIDE
FOR ITS USE.
B) IT ESTABLISHES UNEF WHICH CONCEIVABLY COULD BE OPERATING
PARALLEL TO ENLARGED UNTSO GROUP.
C) IT ESTABLISHES UNEF "UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY
COUNCIL" WHICH COULD BE INTERPRETED AS CONTRARY TO US
VIEW OF PLACEKEEPING.
D) IS POTENTIAL REMINDER OF EVENTUAL WITHDRAWAL OF P LEVIES
UNEF IN 1967, WHICH HELPED PRECIPITATE 1967 WAR.

2. HOWEVER, ALTHOUGH WORDS "TO SET UP" ARE UNFORTUNATE THE
PARA DOES NOT COMMIT SC TO SEND A UNEF TO MIDDLE EAST AND
THAT DECISION REMAINS TO BE MADE. FURTHERMORE, USE OF THE
WORD "AUTHORITY" RATHER THAN "CONTROL" LEAVES A CERTAIN AMOUNT
OF AMBIGUITY ABOUT THE ROLE OF THE SC IN OPERATIONS OF SUCH
A FORCE AS OPPOSED TO THAT OF SYG.

3. THEREFORE, ONE CAN ARGUE THAT THE FINAL ESTABLISHMENT AND
DISPATCH OF A UNEF TO THE MIDDLE EAST WOULD REQUIRE FURTHER
VETUABLE SC ACTION WHICH WOULD DEFINE THE MANDATE AND PRESUMABLY
INCLUDE OTHER PROVISIONS SUCH AS FORCE COMPOSITION, COMMANDER,
HOST COUNTRY AGREEMENTS AND AGREEMENTS WITH CONTRIBUTING COUNTRIES.
THIS IS THE WAY IN WHICH UK INTERPRETS THE PARA. UK AT
THIS POINT IS INCLINED TO ACCEPT IT.

4. IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO SUBSTITUTE A NEW PARA AS FOLLOWS:

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"REQUESTS THAT THE SECRETARY GENERAL DRAW UP A PLAN FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNITED NATIONS EMERGENCY FORCE AND SUBMIT IT TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL WITHIN 24 (OR 48) HOURS."

5. THIS IN FACT MAY BE WHAT AT LEAST SOME OF THE SPONSORS INTENDED AND IS A MUCH MORE LOGICAL STEP THAN SETTING UP AN EMERGENCY FORCE AND DECIDING LATER WHETHER TO USE IT.

6. OUR SOUNDINGS INDICATE THAT ALL OTHER SC MEMBERS WOULD PROBABLY VOTE FOR RIS AS IT STANDS, PUTTING US IN A POSITION OF SPLENDID ISOLATION. WE THEREFORE URGENTLY PROPOSE THAT WE BE AUTHORIZED AT OPENING OF BUSINESS OCT 25 TO SEEK AGREEMENT FOR SUGGESTED NEW LANGUAGE PARA 4 ABOVE. IF THIS PROVES UNSUCCESSFUL, WE SUGGEST THAT DEPT ALSO SERIOUSLY CONSIDER ACCEPTING PRESENT LANGUAGE WITH EXPLANATION OF WHAT WE INTERPRET THIS LANGUAGE TO MEAN AS IN PARA 3 ABOVE.

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25 Oct

OP IMMED
DE RUEHC #0444 2980837
O 250811Z OCT 73
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY QUARACHOTT IMMEDIATE UOON
ZEN/AMEMBASSY SUVA BY POUCH
ZEN/AMEMBASSY MANJUL BY POUCH
ZEN/AMCONSUL CIBACAO BY POUCH
ZEN/AMCONSUL MARTIQUER BY POUCH.
XNT AMEMBASSY SUVA
AMEMBASSY MANJUL

S E C R E T STATE 210444

FXDIS
KUWAIT POUCH DISCARD
DHA
BEIRUT POUCH DISCARD
BRASILIA POUCH RCTEE
E.O. 11652: G.S.
TAGS: XF
SUBJECT: MIDDLE EAST SITUATION

1. FOLLOWING IS THE SITUATION THROUGH EVENING OF OCT. 24.

2. MILITARY SITUATION. CEASEFIRE WHICH WENT INTO EFFECT AT 0700 BATTLEFIELD TIME 24 OCT. (0100 EDT) WAS APPARENTLY VIOLATED ON EGYPTIAN FRONT AT ABOUT 1400 LOCAL (0800 EDT) WHEN, ISRAELIS SAY, EGYPTIAN THIRD ARMY BEGAN ATTEMPT BREAK OUT OF ITS POSITION EAST OF THE CANAL TOWARD THE MITLA PASS. SIMULTANEOUSLY EGYPTIAN THIRD ARMY UNITS WEST OF THE CANAL, NEAR SUEZ CITY, WERE ALSO IN ACTION, AND WHAT THE IDF TERMED MASSIVE EGYPTIAN AIR ACTIVITY SUPPORTED OPERATIONS ON BOTH BANKS. BY END OF 24 OCT., HOWEVER, FIGHTING ON SOUTHERN PART OF SUEZ FRONT SEEMED TO HAVE TAPERED OFF WITH LITTLE CHANGE IN DISPOSITIONS OF FORCES DURING DAY. IDF FORCES WERE STILL AT ADABIYA, SOUTH OF SUEZ CITY, CUTTING OFF THE CITY AND THIRD ARMY FORCES ON THE EAST BANK. -THE NORTHERN PART OF THE SUEZ FRONT, CONTAINING ELEMENTS OF THE SECOND ARMY, REMAINED QUIET ON

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24 OCT. FOLLOWING SYRIAN ACCEPTANCE OF THE CEASE FIRE,
THE GILAN FRONT IS ALSO QUIET ON 24 OCT.

3. CEASEFIRE. AS EGYPT AND THE EARLIER, SYRIA ANNOUNCED
IT ACCEPTED CEASEFIRE ON CONDITION THAT IT WOULD BE A
(1) COMPLETE ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL FROM ALL ARAB TERRITORY

OCCUPIED SINCE 1967 AND AFTER; (2) SAFEGUARDING THE
LEGITIMATE NATIONAL RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE UN RESOLUTION, AND (3) ISRAEL ACCEPTED
AND APPLIED THE CEASEFIRE RESOLUTION. EGYPT CALLED
ANOTHER MEETING OF SECURITY COUNCIL IN EVENING 24 OCT. TO
CONSIDER CHARGES OF ISRAELI VIOLATIONS OF CEASEFIRE.
EGYPT SAID IT WOULD ALSO REQUEST COUNCIL TO CALL ON US AND
USSR TO SEND FORCES OF THEIR OWN TO SUPERVISE AND ENFORCE
CEASEFIRE. A WASHINGTON SPOKESMAN SAID US GOVERNMENT
INTEND TO SEND ITS FORCES TO ATLEAST FOR THIS PURPOSE.
UNTSO OBSERVERS LEFT CAIRO TO SET UP NEW OBSERVATION
POSTS APPROVED BY ISRAELIS ON THE WEST BANK OF THE GILAN.
BUT THE MOVES WERE REPORTED TO SET UP POSTS ON WEST BANK
OF CANAL. SOME UNTSO POSTS CONTINUE TO FUNCTION IN
GILAN BUT THESE WILL HAVE TO BE MOVED AND OUTPOSTS
COVER THE NEW CEASEFIRE LINE. ACCORDING TO UNTSO REPORTS,
POPULAR PRACTICE OF CEASEFIRE WAS GOOD BOTH IN ARAB
COUNTRIES AND ISRAEL. IN SYRIA, WESTERN ARABIA WERE
DESCRIBED PRESIDENT AS AN OPPORTUNITY TO BRING PEACE TO
NATIONS OF THE MIDDLE EAST. SYRIA'S ACCEPTANCE OF CEASEFIRE
FIRE. LEFTIST SYRIAN ELEMENTS, SUPPORTED BY ISRAELI AND
LARGE ISRAELI FORCES, SOUGHT CONTINUATION OF FIGHTING, AND
PERHAPS ASAD'S DEFEAT. ASAD'S POSITION IS ALSO WEAKENED
UNDER PRESURE AS RESULT OF WIDESPREAD EGYPTIAN FEELING
THAT ARAB COUNTRIES SHOULD CONTINUE THE FIGHT.

4. MILITARY RESUPPLY. IN WASHINGTON THE DEPARTMENT
SPOKESMAN ANNOUNCED US WILLINGNESS TO DISCUSS WITH THE
SOVIET UNION A REDUCTION OF EMERGENCY RESUPPLY EFFORT.

5. PRISONERS. US CONTINUED ITS EFFORTS THROUGH OCTOBER
TO SECURE RAPID AND COMPLETE EXCHANGE OF PRISONERS.

6. POLITICAL. IN WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN SAID
THAT THERE IS NO QUOTE PRESCRIBED FORM OR PRECISELY
FORMULA UNQUOTE FOR NEGOTIATION PROCESS WHICH IS INTENDED
TO FOLLOW CEASEFIRE.

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7. OIL. EMBASSY JIDDA POINTS OUT THAT DESPITE NEARLY 25 PERCENT CUTBACK IN SAUDI OIL EXPORTS, RECENTLY REPORTED RISES IN GULF OIL POSTED PRICES MEAN THAT SAUDIS WILL ACTUALLY INCREASE NET CURRENT INCOME BY DOLLARS 4-5 MILLION PER DAY. AMERICAN OIL COMPANY OFFICIALS REPORT THAT ONLY IF FOLLOW-THROUGH AND IMPLEMENTATION OF RESOLUTION 242 WILL THE SAUDIS BE PERSUADED TO LIFT THEIR PRODUCTION CUTBACKS AND EXPORT EMBARGO; IF THESE MEASURES DO NOT SUCCEED IN PRODUCING RESULTS, SAUDIS MAY GO FURTHER, INCLUDING NATIONALIZATION OF AMERICAN OIL INTERESTS IN KINGDOM. SAUDI OIL MINISTER YAMANI HAS TOLD

JAPANESE THAT THEY CAN ESCAPE A 14-15 PERCENT CUT IN SAUDI OIL SHIPMENTS TO JAPAN ONLY BY CUTTING DIPLOMATIC OR ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL, SELLING ARMS TO ARAB STATES, OR BY LOBBYING INTENSIVELY WITH US ON BEHALF OF A SETTLEMENT OF THE MIDEAST CONFLICT QUOTE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE UN RESOLUTIONS. UNQUOTE. KUWAIT AND QATAR HAVE FOLLOWED EXAMPLE OF ALGERIA AND IRAQ IN EMBARGING OIL SHIPMENTS TO NETHERLANDS -- ESTIMATED AT 11 PERCENT OF TOTAL KUWAIT PRODUCTION. MEANWHILE, KUWAIT OIL WORKERS' THREE-DAY STRIKE AGAINST ANGLO-AMERICAN KUWAIT OIL COMPANY AND AMERICAN INDEPENDENT OIL COMPANY IS IN ITS SECOND DAY WITH ALL REFINING OPERATIONS AT A STANDSTILL. GOVT OF BAHRAIN HAS HALTED DELIVERIES BY CALTEX TO TWO TANKERS FOR US FORCES IN FAR EAST. UNITED ARAB EMIRATE PRESIDENT SHAHIN ZAYID HAS WARNED THAT IN ADDITION TO THE OIL EXPORT EMBARGO THE UAE MAY TAKE FURTHER STEPS AGAINST US ECONOMIC INTEREST.

8. LA SALLE INCIDENT. THE LA SALLE, A US MERCHANT SHIP RETURNING FROM RED SEA PORTS (INCLUDING JIDDA, WHERE CARGO FOR JORDAN WAS OFF-LOADED), WAS HALTED BY UNIDENTIFIED WARSHIP FIRING ACROSS LA SALLE'S BOW. DEPARTURE OF ADAMS, A COMIDEASTOR DESTROYER, FROM DJIBOUTI TO ESCORT LA SALLE WAS STOPPED BY THE FRENCH PORT COMMANDER, WHO CITED NEED TO MAINTAIN NEUTRALITY THEIR TERRITORY. THE US NAVY IS PROTESTING THIS ORDER TO FRENCH PORT COMMANDER. THE LA SALLE IS NOW STEAMING FOR DJIBOUTI, REPORTEDLY WITHOUT DAMAGE OR CASUALTIES. THE ADAMS, WHEN IT SAILS, IS UNDER ORDERS TO CONVOY OTHER US MERCHANT SHIPS NOW NEAR DJIBOUTI INTO THE RED SEA. KISSINGER
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